


SECRET

# 10 DOWNING STREET

THIS FILE MUST NOT GO OUTSIDE 10 DOWNING ST

FILE TITLE: <p>Relations</p>		SERIES <p>YUGOSLAVIA</p>
		PART: <p>46</p>
PART BEGINS: <p>14 June 1995.</p>	PART ENDS: <p><del>14</del> <del>15</del> JULY 1995 12</p>	CAB ONE:

 <p>PART CLOSED</p>									
<p>PREM 19/5487</p>									

SECRET

**PART**

**CLOSED**



## YUGOSLAVIA

## RELATIONS PART 46

DATE	FROM	TO	SUBJECT	S/TS
26.6.95	CO	FA/PS	Carves Council: wire for the Press on the Appr of Casi Bildr and on former Yugoslavia	
26.6.95	FA/PS	MOD	Deployment of 24 Air Mobile Brigade	
28.6.95	MOD	FA/PS	Bosnia and The Gulf: Parliamentary Bulletin	
VID			France President: Statement on Behalf of the European Council: former Yugoslavia.	
29.6.95	MOD	FCO	Deployment of 24 Air Mobile Brigade	
30.6.95	MOD	FA/PS	Bosnia: 24 Airmobile Brigade	
30.6.95	FCO	FA/PS	Deals over Hostages	
30.6.95			Washington Tel : 1595	
1.7.95			Belgrade Tel : 402	
3.7.95	CH/EX	SS/MOD	Reinforcements for UNPROFOR	
3.7.95			Washington Tel : 1612	
5.7.95			Stockholm Tel : 269	
5.7.95			Nato Tel : 321	
5.7.95	MOD	FA/PS	Parliamentary Bulletin	
5.7.95	UN	PM	Congratulations to PM	
6.7.95	HS	PM	Irma Hadzimuratovic	
7.7.95	FA/PS	FCO	FA/PS conversation with Levitte : France / Bosnia	
7.7.95	FA/PS	PM	Update & brief for Lord Owen	
7.7.95	CO	FA/PS	Summary of recent events	
7.7.95	MOD	FA/PS	24 Airmobile Brigade	
7.7.95	FCO	FA/PS	Update	
9.7.95	Bosnia PM	PM	Srebrenica - threat of attack	

## YUGOSLAVIA

## RELATIONS PART 46

DATE	FROM	TO	SUBJECT	S/TS
16.6.95			PM's Doorstep in Halifax	
16.6.95	FCO	PS/FCS	Way Forward on Bosnia troop financing	
16.6.95	FA/PS	FCO	(M) - US President	
16.6.95	FA/PS	FCO	(M) - G 7 Heads of Government Dinner	
19.6.95	SS/MOD	PM	24 Air Mobile Brigade	
19.6.95	FA/PS	PM	Reinforcements to Bosnia	
19.6.95			Extract HoC statement G 7 Summit Halifax	
19.6.95			Paris :Tel:808	
20.6.95	FA/PS	FCO	FA/PS conversation with Lake White House	
20.6.95	FA/PS	FCO	Italy / Bosnia : Emergency Planning	135
21.6.95			Washington Tel : 1517	
21.6.95	MOD	FA/PS	Parliamentary Bulletin	
21.6.95	MOD	FA/APS	Use of Air Power in Bosnia	
21.6.95	CO	FA/PS	Operation Deny Flight	
21.6.95			New York :Tel 1993	
22.6.95	FA/PS	FCO	FA/PS conversation with Levitte : European Council	
22.6.95	FCS	PM	Deployment of 24 Air Mobile Brigade	
22.6.95	CO	FA/PS	Deployment of 24 Air Mobile Brigade	
23.6.95	HMA W'ton	FCO	Bosnia: UNPROFOR Withdrawal	

23.6.95 FCO FA/PS European Council : Bosnia

## YUGOSLAVIA

## RELATIONS PART 46

DATE	FROM	TO	SUBJECT	S/TS
14.6.95			UKDEL Tel : 276	
14.6.95			Washington Tels : 1448 , 1450	
14.6.95			FCO Tels : 495 , 112	
14.6.95	FA/APS	MOD	NATO Withdrawl Plan 40104	
14.6.95	FA/PS	FCO	Reply from US President	
14.6.95			Belgrade tel : 361	
14.6.95			Washington tel : 1458	
14.6.95			Ottawa Tel : 280	
14.6.95	FCO	FA/PS	The US Attitude	
15.6.95	US Pres	PM	(H) - Short Term Issues	
15.6.95	FA/APS	Chapman	Acknowledgment of US President's message	
15.6.95	MOD	FA/APS	BRITFOR Rules of Engagement	
15.6.95	FCO	FA/PS	Casualty Figures	
15.6.95			French Draft Statement issued after Heads of Govt Dinner at G7 Halifax Summit	
15.6.95	AG	MOD	Bosnia: NATO withdrawal plan	
16.6.95			UKMIS Tel : 1947	

RESTRICTED

155256  
MDHIAN 4343

RESTRICTED

FM OTTAWA

TO DESKBY 121630Z FCO

TELNO 309

OF 121430Z JULY 95

INFO DESKBY 121630Z UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, THE HAGUE

INFO IMMEDIATE ROME, BELGRADE, ZAGREB, SARAJEVO

INFO IMMEDIATE CABINET OFFICE, MODUK, JHQ SALISBURY

INFO IMMEDIATE ACTOR, WHIRL

for conversation with Chretien,  
if it happens. - Canadian  
have to decide in  
Agree whether to  
renew their troop  
presence.

SUBJECT: BOSNIA: CANADIAN VIEWS

SUMMARY

1. Fall of Srebrenica confirms Canadian view that UN operation in Bosnia has run its term. They think political discussions are getting nowhere and UNPROFOR can no longer fill its humanitarian role. UN and NATO could be suffering worse humiliation by staying than leaving. But while Canada now inclined to withdrawal, I doubt they would do so unilaterally.

DETAIL

2. I spoke to Gordon Smith (PUS-equivalent, DFA) about Bosnia in the context of the PUS's postponed visit. Smith hopes to discuss Bosnia by telephone with the PUS today. His comments to me confirm earlier indications of Canadian thinking from de Chastelain (Canadian CDS) and from my French colleague after a visit by Dufourcq.

3. Smith said that, even before the Bosnian Serb capture of Srebrenica, the Canadian Government was coming to the view that the UN operation in Bosnia had reached "a fork in the road". The fall of Srebrenica could be the beginning of the end.

4. The Canadians thought that the political exchanges with the parties were not getting anywhere. Repeated rounds of discussion under Contact Group auspices had been fruitless. Bildt had made tremendous efforts since his arrival, but could not show progress.

5. Smith noted that in recent weeks UNPROFOR had become quite

PAGE 1  
RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

15 56  
MDHIAN 43

unable to carry out its humanitarian duties. As Chastelain confirmed separately, Canada's assessment was strongly influenced by the frustrations of their own contingent in Visoko. Their main body of troops cannot leave their base, their remaining observation posts are subject to Bosnian harassment and they had suffered major hostage-taking in May followed by mining of the approaches to their base - all without being able to play a useful humanitarian role.

6. Smith considered that, in present conditions, the UN and NATO suffered almost daily humiliation. The withdrawal of UNPROFOR would be humiliating too. But at least this would have a definite purpose, which was better than the present muddling through.

7. Smith noted that the Bosnian forces in Srebrenica had resisted weakly. He wondered whether both Bosnian Serbs and Muslims now wanted to see UNPROFOR depart. If so, he feared that this could soon spill over into Croatia and endanger UN forces there.

8. As the French Ambassador told me, the Canadians had rehearsed these gloomy views to Dufourcq when he visited Ottawa on 10 July. Dufourcq had briefly seen Foreign Minister Ouellet, who had reinforced them. In a statement to the visiting OSCE parliamentary assembly last week, Prime Minister Chretien had also questioned whether UNPROFOR was still able to discharge its mandate.

#### COMMENT

9. These gloomy Canadian views have emerged as the government begins to prepare for a decision in August on whether to renew the mandate of its battalions in Bosnia and Croatia. The government has always supported UNPROFOR's humanitarian role but resisted any moves, whether in the UN or NATO, which would turn UN forces into combatants. Public support for Canada's forces in former Yugoslavia also drops sharply if they are seen as no longer able to play a useful role.

10. For all this, I believe Canada would be very reluctant to withdraw its forces from former Yugoslavia unilaterally. They would not want to cut and run if we and the French were remaining to take the heat. But in any choice between withdrawal and a

PAGE 2  
RESTRICTED



RESTRICTED

155256  
MDHIAN 4343

more aggressive stance for UNPROFOR, they clearly favour withdrawal.

11. I have arranged to see Smith at 1500Z on 14 July and could use this to stiffen the Canadians if necessary.

BAYNE

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 159MAIN 110

YUGOSLAVIA

EAU

ADDITIONAL 49

CAOFF//MR GALSWORTHY  
CAOFF//FILBY AIR CDR  
CAOFF//MR C BLACK  
CAOFF//MR GOULD  
CAOFF//LYALL-GRANT  
CAOFF//MR TALLANTIRE  
CAOFF//MR WILLIAMS J  
CAOFF//MISS COLLINS  
MOD//PS/DEFENCE SEC  
MOD//PS/PUS  
MOD//HD DI(EUR)POL 3  
MOD//MR OMAND DUS P  
MOD//MR MANSON  
MOD//GS SEC/C DAVENPORT  
MOD//ACDS(OPS/CY)  
MOD//DCDS(C)  
MOD//DIO  
MOD//MISS SCHOLEFIELD  
. (FP (BOSNIA) RM 5163)  
MOD//MS SAMUEL  
. (PRESS/SEC RM 6328)  
MOD//HD/SP(BOSNIA)RM 5163

PS/PM  
NO 10//MR REES  
DTI//MR MANTLE  
DTI//MR LEVINSON  
DTI//MR ARATHOON  
DTI//MR MEADWAY  
HMT//MISS CATCHPOLE  
HMT//MR RUTTER AND MR COHEN  
HMT//MISS YOUNG  
HMT//MRS SAMUEL  
HMT//MS YOUNG  
HMT//PS/CHANCELLOR  
BANKE//MR GAMMON  
BANKE//S&S DIV  
HO//MR ELLINOR  
ECGD//MR HAWTIN  
D/TSPT//MS WHATMORE  
D/TSPT//MR GOLDMAN  
ATT GEN//WHOMERSLEY  
HMCE//MR RUSSELL  
HMCE//MISS MAWER  
HMCE//MR TREVETT

PAGE 3  
RESTRICTED

NNNN

SECRET - PERSONAL



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA



File

From the Private Secretary

12 July 1995

Dear William,

## FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

I am writing to confirm various conversations I have had with you, Margaret Aldred and Paul Lever in the course of the day.

During his meeting with the Foreign Secretary this morning, the Prime Minister said that he would like to see an early paper covering the options for future policy on the former Yugoslavia.

The paper should include both diplomatic and military aspects of the problem; and deal with the likelihood of further offensives in Croatia and the withdrawal of UNCRO as well as with Bosnia. The Prime Minister asked that it should examine the possibility of convening a last-ditch conference at either Head of Government or Foreign Minister level in a final effort to induce the parties to negotiate before any withdrawal of UNPROFOR (with the consequences that would flow thereafter).

We agreed that FCO, MOD and Cabinet Office would discuss the format of the paper or papers to meet the Prime Minister's request, **which should reach me in time for the weekend box.** (It would help greatly to receive these papers no later than 1700 on Friday, as I shall be involved in talks from 1800 onwards.)

In the first instance, these papers should be circulated only to addressees of this letter. After the weekend, we can take a view on the papers for the OPD meeting on 20 July.

Gorazde

The fall of Srebrenica highlighted the problems surrounding our contingent in Gorazde. The Prime Minister has asked for separate briefing on the options which we and UNPROFOR have there. He wishes to be certain

SECRET - PERSONAL

**SECRET - PERSONAL**

- 2 -

that the UK contingent will not find itself in the predicament which the Dutch have faced in Srebrenica. This presumably means that a decision will have to be taken between reinforcement and contingency evacuation plans. We have always worked on the basis that our forces must not be asked to withdraw without their equipment (except in the sort of emergency which we would hope to pre-empt).

The Prime Minister is aware that a number of plans have been considered within the MOD. He has asked for a short paper from the MOD on the options (the FCO and Cabinet Office will wish to make an input to the political/diplomatic aspects).

The Prime Minister may wish to supplement this with a short oral military briefing on the afternoon of Friday 14 July.

I am sending copies of this letter to Margaret Aldred (Ministry of Defence) and Paul Lever and Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

*yours ever,*

*Roderic*

**RODERIC LYNE**

William Ehrman Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

**SECRET - PERSONAL**



*EO 12/7*  
*file*  
*12/7*

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 0171-21 82111/2/3

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 6/18/5G

*12/7* July 1995

*Dear Roderic,*

**BOSNIA AND THE GULF: PARLIAMENTARY BULLETIN**


I attach the next of our regular bulletins on the activities of British forces in Bosnia and the Gulf. This will be placed in the Library of each House tomorrow at 15.30.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD and to the Minister of Overseas Development, to Dugald Sandeman (Lord President's Office) to Murdo Maclean (Chief Whip's Office) and to Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever*  
*Mollie*

(MOLLIE FIELD)  
Private Secretary

R M J Lyne Esq CMG  
10 Downing Street



Recycled Paper

EVENTS IN YUGOSLAVIA AND IRAQ - ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

12 July 1995

The Former Yugoslavia

- On 10 July the BSA launched an attack on Sebrenica. In the course of this action one Dutch soldier was killed by BiH forces and 30 Dutch soldiers detained by the BSA. On 11 July BSA forces launched a further attack and the Dutch commander requested Close Air Support (CAS). Two CAS missions by NATO aircraft were launched resulting in the destruction of two BSA tanks. Following a BSA ultimatum threatening the lives of the Dutch detainees unless air attacks ceased, further CAS missions were cancelled. The Dutch soldiers subsequently withdrew to their compound at Potocari, north of the town. By 12 July, over 20,000 refugees had fled to the Potocari area.
- A party of some 200 logistics personnel arrived in theatre on 8/9 July. They will provide immediate support to the Multi-national Brigade and also to 24 Airmobile Brigade when it arrives.
- BRITFOR continues to help monitor the activities of the warring factions along the confrontation lines in Bosnia. In Sarajevo, a 70-strong British Army mortar locating troop equipped with Cymbeline mortar locating radar continues to monitor such activities around the city. 6 Army Lynx helicopters are now operating in Bosnia as part of our additional contribution to UNPROFOR.
- The UNHCR humanitarian airlift into Sarajevo is still suspended. The total amount of aid delivered by the RAF Hercules remains at 23,943 tonnes.
- 4 RN Sea Kings remain at Divulje Barracks, Split, with 2 permanently on stand-by for casualty evacuation.

- The Royal Navy Task Group comprising HMS ILLUSTRIOUS, HMS BOXER and RFAs FORT AUSTIN and OLNAs are on operations in the Adriatic.
- RFA RESOURCE remains in Split harbour providing accommodation and stores support to BRITFOR.
- HMS GLASGOW and HMS BATTLEAXE continue, as part of NATO's Standing Naval Forces Atlantic and Mediterranean respectively, to conduct stop and search operations in the Adriatic in support of the UN arms embargo and trade sanctions. The last detachment of two RAF Nimrod MPA aircraft returned to base on 6 July. The next detachment is due to arrive in Sigonella in Sicily, to support this operation, on 8 August.
- 8 RAF Jaguars are on stand-by at Gioia del Colle, Italy, as part of the NATO capability for air operations over Bosnia. 4 Jaguars remain on stand by in the UK.
- RAF Sentry E3D, Tornado F3 aircraft, and Sea Harriers embarked on HMS ILLUSTRIOUS, together with Tristar air-to-air refuelling support, continue to play their part in NATO NFZ operations.

#### The Gulf

- Reconnaissance sorties by RAF Tornados in northern and southern Iraq, as part of coalition action in support of UN Security Council Resolution 688, continue on a routine basis.

Key

UNHCR	UN High Commission for Refugees
BRITFOR	British Forces
UNPROFOR	UN Protection Force
RFA	Royal Fleet Auxiliary
MPA	Maritime Patrol Aircraft
NFZ	No Fly Zone

CONFIDENTIAL



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 0171-21 82111/2/3

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 6/18/5G

12 July 1995

*File**Mr  
17/11/95**Dear William,***BOSNIA: CALL FROM DR VOORHOEVE**

As I told you on the telephone, Dr Voorhoeve telephoned the Defence Secretary shortly before 1000 this morning.

He reported that the Dutch compound had been surrounded by Bosnian Serb tanks and armoured personnel carriers this morning, and that Mladic was threatening to shell the compound if the Dutch Commander did not disarm the remaining BiH troops. In response to a question from Mr Portillo, Dr Voorhoeve said that, while there were some 3,000 refugees inside the Dutch compound, and 18 to 20,000 outside, there were no armed BiH troops in the compound. The refugees there were mainly women, children and the elderly. Many were weak or wounded. He was concerned that the Serbs would carry out their threat to shell the compound; he simply did not know what they would do next. The most important thing was to get humanitarian assistance - medical supplies, drinking water, and food - into the compound. The Dutch troops had less than 24 hours supply for themselves and the wounded. Pressure from the international community on the Bosnian Serbs to allow humanitarian supplies into Srebrenica was urgent. He also wanted urgently to negotiate free exit for both UNPROFOR (including, now, some 40 hostages), and, more importantly, the refugees. The Dutch Battalion had done all they could but the BiH troops, which he estimated at up to 2,000, had simply left during the night, he thought for Tuzla. There were still some BiH troops in the west of the enclave. Mladic was waging "psychological warfare". He had explained this to General Smith and asked him to support the Dutch Battalion Commander in his negotiations with Mladic.

The Defence Secretary sympathised with Dr Voorhoeve's predicament. We had a limited number of cards to play and our first objective must be to sustain the humanitarian effort. We would use every means at our disposal to bring pressure to bear on the Bosnian Serbs to allow humanitarian supplies into the enclaves. We were also obviously concerned about the precedent which the fall of Srebrenica might set for the other enclaves. There was a serious risk that it would put us on the slippery slope towards the collapse of the UN and, possibly, withdrawal. We would therefore pursue whatever, limited, options we had to ensure that this slide did not begin.

William Ehrman Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL





## CONFIDENTIAL

The UK would have liked to have seen Srebrenica demilitarised, but it may be that the situation had moved on. Dr Voorhoeve suspected that demilitarisation was not obtainable. We had to recognise the enclave was now under Serb control and they had no incentive to cooperate. He too was concerned that the fall of Srebrenica could herald the fall of Zepa and Gorazde. We should not necessarily assume, however, that the fall of the enclaves would lead to the withdrawal of the UN from Bosnia. From one perspective, they had always been potential hostages. We might have the opportunity for UNPROFOR to re-group in central Bosnia and stabilise the situation there.

The Defence Secretary said that it was important to ensure that in all our public comments we remained realistic. British forces were not in a position to defend Gorazde and we should not exacerbate their problems by rhetoric we needed to make sure that the British troops' orders were realistic.

On the RRF, Dr Voorhoeve agreed that it would be impossible for it to play any role in Srebrenica; and that calls for this were unhelpful. Any effort to retake the enclave would require thousands of men and could well lead to no result. The Defence Secretary said we had no need to feel humiliated in trying to provide humanitarian aid to the Bosnians; if UN troops had to leave behind their weapons and vehicles, however, that would be a different matter.

The Defence Secretary said that if the Dutch really believed they had to leave then we had to respect their judgement and provide whatever help we could. Dr Voorhoeve said the Bosnian Serbs had not responded to the Dutch request and a very difficult situation could develop within the next few days as the condition of the refugees deteriorated. He was very concerned about the potential ethical dilemmas this would pose. He wondered whether the international community could find a negotiator with sufficient political clout to talk to Mladic; without this the situation would become more difficult. He suggested Gurkin or another Russian might be a suitable candidate.

Finally, the Defence Secretary said he understood the Dutch position and would communicate Dr Voorhoeve's comments to the Foreign Secretary. (Dr Voorhoeve also asked for his very best wishes to be passed to Mr Rifkind.) He drew comfort from Dr Voorhoeve's optimism that the fall of the enclaves would not necessarily mean the end of the UN's mission in Voorheuvre. We would do whatever we could to help the Dutch.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Roderic Lyne (No.10) and to Melanie Leech and David Gould (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever,*  
*Mangan.*

(P M ALDRED)  
Private Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

Rodeni

Have just returned to have the  
attached letter into my hands - I  
gather that at 1400, 2 x (?US)  
F16s attacked a German sub  
tank outside Srebrenica

I imagine you know all  
this?

Love

"/4

P.s. General's must belts.

**SECRET, UK-EYES-A**

389

 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
 WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 0171-21 82111/2/3

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 6/18/5G

11 July 1995

Dear Rademz,

The situation in Srebrenica

You asked for urgent advice on the situation in Srebrenica and related issues in theatre before today's Prime Minister's questions. I am sending to you separately Q&A material for use in the House. This note provides a classified and background report on the situation in Srebrenica. The JIC issued an immediate assessment (JIC(95)(IA)33) on the Bosnian Serb Attack on the Srebrenica enclave last night.

The present position and background

The recent BSA attack on the Srebrenica enclave was prompted by constant BiH attacks over the previous 3 months on the BSA supply route to the south of the enclave. The BSA attacks are almost certainly initiated by the local commander and we do not think they are part of a Pale inspired plan to overrun the enclave.

At the moment, the BSA have been halted by DUTCHBAT who yesterday established a blocking position on the road on the southern edge of the town. The BSA conducted an attack last night at about 20.00hrs local with approximately one company and four tanks. The Dutch were targeted by the BSA and lost one APC, but there are no reports of casualties. The situation was described as tense, but stable as of midnight. The Serbs appear to be holding their position at the moment. They continue to hold 32 hostages, though reports from Hans Pijesak (BSA Army Command) state that the whole action is a local effort and that the Dutch peacekeepers will be returned today.

We have just heard that Janvier has asked for CAS for the Dutch in Srebrenica, and that 2 F16s are airborne with orders to attack targets of opportunity.

 R M J Lyne Esq CMG  
 10 Downing Street

 1 of 3  
**SECRET, UK-EYES-A**


Recycled Paper

**SECRET, UK-EYES-A**

JIC Assessment of Serb intentions

Yesterday a JIC IA covered the events in Srebrenica and the key judgements reflect the position as we see it. The BSA action is in direct response to BiH pressure on a BSA line of communication and the BSA reacted by forcing the BiH back towards Srebrenica. The Serbs found that there was little resistance and so they were able to exploit further than their original objectives. This has brought them into direct confrontation with the UN and it will be very difficult for the Serbs to back away without loss of face.

The main risk in the situation is that of escalation caused by the inappropriate use of air power, particularly air strikes which the BSA may regard as partisan. Although there is no direct threat to the other enclaves at present, precipitous action could inflame the situation. Zepa is reported to be experiencing increased tension, but that is most probably due to the proximity of the enclave to Srebrenica. There is no intelligence to suggest that the BSA have reinforced the general enclave area which could presage a wider offensive to take the enclaves. The BSA are still stretched by the BiH June offensive around Sarajevo and cannot spare the troops for other activities as long as the threat to their hold on the capital remains.

We do not believe that the problem in Srebrenica is an indication that Gorazde is under any greater threat than in the past. If, however, the overall situation escalates then action against Gorazde remains a BSA option, but without significant BSA reinforcement in the Gorazde area the BSA could not mount an offensive to take the enclave with any degree of confidence in the final outcome.

UN Response

An ultimatum was issued by a BSA local commander ordering the Dutch contingent and the BiH to depart by this morning, leaving their equipment and weapons behind. In speaking to the press, a UN spokesman in Sarajevo (Ivanko) made clear that the UN totally rejected this ultimatum in every respect. A senior aide to General Mladic, Tolimir, has attempted to distance the BSA from the ultimatum, saying it is not agreed BSA policy.

General Smith's current objective is to maintain the integrity of the enclaves and to contribute to conditions of stability through a UN presence. We would expect withdrawal of the Dutch contingent to be considered only as a last resort and in extremis given the risk that it would mean leaving the civilian population and the BiH to their fate. General Janvier has now called for CAS, but the general confusion caused by the attack may complicate the use of air power and the identification of suitable targets which do not carry unacceptable risks for UNPROFOR personnel on the ground (including three British personnel). There are no plans to use the RRF (despite hints to the contrary from Paris). Planning for the use of the RRF is in the final stages of preparation but a lack of co-ordinated training and logistic problems to date would prevent the RRF being used at present for

2 of 3

**SECRET, UK-EYES-A**

**SECRET, UK-EYES-A**

anything other than a Sarajevo resupply operation. The Multinational Brigade is, in any case, based some distance away from Srebrenica and, in the absence of the helicopter reinforcements due in theatre shortly, is not well placed to reach the enclave in a suitable timescale.

I hope this provides the information you require. I am sending a copy of this letter to William Erhman (FCO).

*Yours ever,*

*Margaret*

(P M ALDRED)  
Private Secretary

3 of 3

**SECRET, UK-EYES-A**

11-JUL-1995 20:50 FROM PRIVATE OFFICE

TO

901718393712 P.02

CONFIDENTIAL

Miss Neville-Jones ⓄSrebrenica

The Foreign and Defence Secretaries met this afternoon to discuss the situation in Srebrenica.

CDS said that the situation on the ground was confused. There were some 730 Dutch troops in the enclave. They were retreating north. There were reports of some 10-12,000 refugees retreating with them. The Dutch Ministry of Defence had requested NATO to help. There were three possibilities: activation of a Quick Reaction Option with US marines helping from off-shore; help from French forces in the multinational brigade, but these were not up and running yet; or negotiation. Srebrenica town was basically in Serb hands. The BIH forces in the enclave (subsequently CDS confirmed there were 1,500 of them) appeared not to have put up a fight. There had been two CAS sorties. In the first a Dutch F16 had destroyed one tank. In the second a US F16 had destroyed a further two tanks. Miss Neville-Jones said that overrunning UNPROFOR when they were blocking the road was qualitatively different from the earlier harassing of BIH forces. She doubted if a decision to overrun could have been taken without Pale's authority.

The Secretary of State asked what reaction we expected from the Bosnian Government. Miss Neville-Jones said that Silajdic would complain that not only were the UN unable to protect safe areas from the air. They had now been shown not to be able to protect them on the ground.

She went on to say that there were two options: we could negotiate to get the Dutch out, or we could negotiate a deal under which they would stay. If the UN withdrew from Srebrenica there was a danger of a real slide. She thought we should try to negotiate the demilitarisation of Srebrenica in return for BSA withdrawal. Ms Evans said that the Bosnian Government and the Bosnian Serbs had reached an agreement in 1992 to demilitarise the enclave, but this had never been implemented.

CONFIDENTIAL

11-JUL-1995 20:51 FROM PRIVATE OFFICE

TO

901718393712 P.03

CONFIDENTIAL

The Secretary of State said that we should not give the impression that we could reverse the situation by physical means. We would be asked three questions:

- Did not the Serb action prove that the safe areas were a farce?
- What were we going to do about Srebrenica?
- Would the Dutch be withdrawn?

He suggested that we respond as follows:

- There had always been a discrepancy between the rhetoric of the SCRs and UNPROFOR's capabilities. The SCRs on the safe areas had expressed aspirations.
- Srebrenica should be maintained as a safe area but should be demilitarised as had been agreed three years ago.
- We should try to persuade the Dutch to stay.

Before speaking publicly on these lines we should concert with the French, Americans and Dutch. The Defence Secretary agreed with the proposed strategy.

11 July 1995

*Sam Shaper*  
PP (W G Ehrman)

cc : PS  
 PS/Sir N Bonsor  
 PS/PUS  
 Mr Richardson  
 Mr Charlton  
 Heads of: EAU  
 UND  
 Sec Pol Dept  
 News Dept  
 Special Adviser  
 Mr Hawtin, AUS(C), MOD .

CONFIDENTIAL

TOTAL P.03

14-JUL-1995 12:40

FCO NEWS DEPARTMENT

P.01/01

Uugo Dist  
=

Gary McCord

RTU0256 2 OVR 70

C-YUGOSLAVIA-SREBENICA-NATO-URGENT

:BC-YUGOSLAVIA-SREBENICA-NATO URGENT

UN requests NATO air power against Serbs

ZAGREB, July 11 (Reuter) - The United Nations called on Tuesday for NATO air power against separatist Serbs invading the U.N.-protected Bosnian enclave of Srebrenica, U.N. sources said.

They told Reuters that U.N. special envoy Yasushi Akashi approved a request during the morning for NATO "close air support" for Dutch peacekeepers under Bosnian Serb fire. But they could not say whether air action was under way.

MORE

#111252 GMT jul 95

RTU0262 2 OVR 143

C-YUGOSLAVIA-SREBENICA-NATO

:BC-YUGOSLAVIA-SREBENICA-NATO =2 ZAGREB

"There was a request for close air support this morning approved by Mr Akashi and sent to NATO," said a U.N. source who asked not to be named. "We do not know whether planes have gone in yet."

A NATO spokesman at the alliance's southern Europe headquarters in Naples, Italy, said by telephone he could neither confirm nor deny air raids were unfolding but he would have more information shortly.

U.N. sources said the Bosnian Serbs appeared to have broken into Srebrenica town in a two-pronged onslaught from areas north and south guarded by peacekeepers.

Dutch peacekeepers had resisted the advance and the local Serb commander gave the U.N. and the enclave's estimated 40,000 Moslems until Thursday morning to get out. Akashi rejected the demand and said the Serbs would face NATO bombing unless they withdrew to previous confrontation lines.

#111302 GMT jul 95

TOTAL P.01

RECEIVED FROM

07.11.1995 14:13

P. 1

- Dual key triggered -
- Bosnian serbs have been attacked
- NATO have <sup>not yet</sup> confirmed -





FCS/95/196

CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

1) Alex

2) Prime Minister (4)

To note.

Rm/L  
11/11

Bosnia

1. I am grateful to you for confirming in your letter of 3 July to me as Defence Secretary that the costs in 1995/96 of the additional troops deploying with UNPROFOR (both 19 Field Regiment and 24 Air Mobile Brigade) can be met from the Reserve.

2. It would be helpful if you and William Waldegrave could also respond to Douglas Hurd's earlier minutes of 25 April and 15 May to the Chief Secretary about this department's wider claim on the Reserve in 1995/96. In the absence of any reply, the United Kingdom is falling into substantial arrears to the UN, especially on the UNPROFOR budget. At a time when we have been emphasising at the highest political level (including at the G7 Summit in Halifax) the need for Member States to pay their contributions to the UN promptly and in full, it is very embarrassing for the UK to be going into the red. Our arrears are already \$26 million, and if we make no further payments by August they will reach record levels of some \$60-70 million. This will only encourage other Member States not to pay their dues and result in further delays in the UN reimbursing troop contributors, including ourselves. It potentially undermines our position with the US as we try to persuade them to pay their peacekeeping and other dues.



3. I am also concerned that we shall be forced shortly to withdraw our 26-strong contingent to the ICFY mission monitoring the closure of the border between the FRY and the Bosnian Serbs. The ICFY mission's work has never been more crucial, and we have for the reasons set out in Douglas Hurd's minute of 15 May already indicated our support in principle for the US initiative that each Contact Group country should increase its contingent to 50. Strengthening the ICFY mission will be a precondition for US agreement on a recognition/sanctions relief package with Milosevic.

4. As you know, I have no provision in my budget for these costs given the normal practice for these to be met from customary access to the Reserve, and in the absence of any agreement to revised arrangements I must ask that the status quo be maintained properly meanwhile.

5. I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, the Defence Secretary and to Sir Robin Butler.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'M Rifkind'.

MALCOLM RIFKIND

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
11 July 1995

**CONFIDENTIAL**

*me*

From: Rod Lyne  
Date: 11 July 1995

**PRIME MINISTER**

cc: Mr Meyer  
Mr Oakden

**BOSNIA: SITREP 11 JULY, 8.00 pm**

The main elements in the situation this evening seem to be:

- ✓ - Srebrenica town: being held by 1500 to 2000 Bosnian Serbs (who have taken the Commander of the Dutch UNPROFOR contingent captive).
- ✓ - Dutch contingent: has withdrawn to Potacari, north of Srebrenica. Did not suffer any more casualties today.
- ✓ - UK officers: there are two "joint Commission observers" and one RAF interpreter with the Dutch. The JCOs have been in touch with their headquarters at Hereford to confirm that they are OK.
- ✓ - Dutch hostages: still being held. UNPROFOR headquarters at Sarajevo trying to negotiate their release.
- ✓ - Muslim refugees: an estimated 12,500 to 25,000 Muslims have, like UNPROFOR, moved northwards out of Srebrenica (the press are quoting higher estimates). According to the Dutch, they are short of food and water.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

## CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

- Air strikes: there were two lots of air strikes by F16s this afternoon, knocking out three tanks. A third close air support operation was about to be mounted when the Dutch UNPROFOR Commander had it halted because the Serbs were threatening to kill his hostages.

Assessment and Background

The JIC will be producing a further assessment tomorrow. The attached MOD letter (received at lunchtime) sets out some of the background. Worth noting the following additional points:

- MOD continue to believe that the Bosnian Serb command in Pale did not plan to over-run Srebrenica. There was apparently little or no resistance by the Bosnian Government forces in Srebrenica to this latest push, and the Serbs therefore pressed on into the town. Indeed, when the Dutch first took up their position forming a line against the Serb advance a couple of days ago, they apparently took a number of shots in the rear from the Muslims.
- The latest information is that the Dutch contingent have not yet asked to be withdrawn. It is also thought that the Muslims might try to stop them leaving.
- These operations have come under the direct control of General Janvier, as Rupert Smith has been on leave on the Dalmatian coast, and has not yet got back to Sarajevo. *(Due back on Friday).*

Dutch Government

The Dutch CDS is in Zagreb consulting Janvier. Dutch Ministers met this evening to consider whether they should seek the withdrawal of their contingent

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

from Srebrenica. It is not clear what they decided. The Foreign Secretary spoke to his Dutch counterpart after their meeting, to suggest that the Dutch contingent should stay put for the time being. *(Latest word from the Dutch Defence Minister is that they want a negotiated withdrawal from Srebrenica when the refugees have been sorted out).*

NATO military experts in Brussels are reviewing options, including possible use of quick-reaction forces (eg the US marines) if there is a need to extract the Dutch. The Foreign and Defence Secretaries do not at the moment find these options attractive.

Diplomatic action

The Foreign and Defence Secretaries conferred this evening. I attach a note of their meeting, and the Foreign Secretary will report further to you in the morning.

They felt the best course was at least to try to persuade the Bosnian Serbs to pull out of Srebrenica, and the Bosnian Government (which has been using the enclave as a launching pad for attacks) to demilitarise it.

The foreign Secretary has spoken to Charette, and agreed that the Security Council should be convened this evening to condemn the Serb attack and reiterate that Srebrenica was a UN "safe area" (!!).

Chirac has spoken publicly of using force to regain Srebrenica, and Charette also talked to Malcolm Rifkind about acting to restore "the dignity of UNPROFOR". Rifkind pointed out that a short-term success would not do a great deal for that if it led to longer term problems.

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

Gorazde and other enclaves

The experts see Zepa as the next most vulnerable enclave. They are reviewing the Gorazde threat assessment but, pending that, think it would require some weeks of build up before the Serbs could be in a position to do to Gorazde what they have done to Srebrenica.

You may wish to glance again at the two JIC papers (on consequences of withdrawal and on Bosnia) which you saw over the weekend.

Paragraph 5 and the annex of the Bosnia paper describe the rationale in the enclaves.

Rodenz

Late news

ROD LYNE

11 July 1995

1. The hyped up treatment on the BBC completely (& typically) ignored the fact that the Muslims had (a) been attacking out of Srebrenica; (b) suddenly stopped defending it, & let the Serbs walk in.
2. Rumours that the US are attracted by Chirac's desire to storm Srebrenica (with our troops!). I have suggested that mod & FCO weigh in heavily: commanders on the ground, not in Washington, to decide.

Ruzh.

f\bosnia.eam

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign &  
Commonwealth  
Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 July 1995

GR - (7) M.

no 11/2

Dear ~~Edward~~,

Letter from the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General

/ I enclose a copy of a faxed letter to the Prime Minister from Mr Yasushi Akashi, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in the former Yugoslavia, congratulating him on his re-election as leader of the Conservative Party.

/ The Prime Minister may wish to respond to Mr Akashi, taking the opportunity to assure him of our continuing support for his effort to achieve a lasting settlement to the conflicts in the region. I enclose a draft.

Yours ever,

Sam

(S J Sharpe)  
Private Secretary

Edward Oakden Esq  
10 Downing Street

DRAFT LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MR YASUSHI AKASHI, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Thank you for your kind letter of 5 July.

Like you, I continue to attach the greatest importance to the search for a lasting settlement to the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. We are fully supporting this through our participation in the Contact Group and through our substantial contribution to the United Nations Peace Forces.

Carl Bildt's appointment to work alongside Thorvald Stoltenberg and the deployment of the Rapid Reaction Force have, I believe, provided a window of opportunity for progress. The key to progress, however, lies as ever with the parties themselves.





10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

10 July 1995

*Dear Sam,*

**MESSAGE FROM IZETBEGOVIC**

I enclose a message from Izetbegovic about the weekend's events around Srebrenica, which arrived yesterday evening.

*Yours ever,*

*Edward Oakden*

**EDWARD OAKDEN**

S J Sharpe Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

*Re  
SM*

*SM*

SUBJECT  
MASTER

Sarajevo, July 9, 1995

Filed on:

Excellency,

The crisis around Srebrenica, which has been besieged since the beginning of the aggression, has persisted for a long period of time.

Srebrenica has been declared a safe area, according to Security Council Resolutions 824(1993) and 836(1993). Furthermore, by the agreement with UNPROFOR, this enclave was demilitarized in 1993.

Despite these facts, the city of Srebrenica and its surroundings have been continuously exposed to shelling. However, since yesterday, the Serb aggressor has initiated a massive mechanized - infantry attack. UNPROFOR troops, which are not numerous in this enclave, are not willing nor capable of protecting the city under attack. More than 60,000 civilians, predominantly women, children and elderly, have found themselves in life-threatening danger.

I urge you to exercise your influence in order for the international community to fulfill its commitments and obligations towards this UN protected area and to prevent a new act of terrorism and genocide against the civilian population of Srebrenica.

I hope for your urgent action.


Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

Alija Izetbegovic

H.E.  
The Rt.Hon. John MAJOR, M.P.  
Prime Minister  
of the United Kingdom  
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign &  
Commonwealth  
Office

7 July 1995

London SW1A 2AH

*Dear Roderic,*Bosnia

The Prime Minister may wish to be brought up to date with the latest developments in Bosnia. It is possible that he will need to telephone President Chirac about Bosnia next week.

The situation in Sarajevo and the enclaves remains serious. The air bridge into Sarajevo has not functioned for 89 days and the city has received no UNHCR convoys by land since 22 June. UNPROFOR are bringing in about 70 tonnes of food a night - about half of Sarajevo's daily needs - in armoured vehicles via the Mount Igman route, usually under some Bosnian Serb fire. Both the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves have received some convoys in the last 10 days, but have barely adequate supplies. Gorazde has received no UNHCR convoys since 21 May. As for Bihac, their last convoys were on 1 July: over the last 12 months, they have received no more than 14% of estimated requirements. The Bosnian Serbs continue to play cat and mouse and UNPROFOR remains without the freedom of movement which it needs.

The level of fighting could be described as moderate except around Sarajevo, where it is intense, with the Bosnian Army making limited gains in their attempt to unblock the city. It is difficult to assess civilian casualties accurately, but over the last 14 days at least 50 Bosnian Muslim civilians have been killed in the conflict. The death toll is still quite low, but rising once again.

Meanwhile Senator Dole's latest arms embargo lifting bill will be debated from 10 July. Present estimates are that it will be supported by around 70% of the Senate. The Administration assure us that President Clinton will veto. Dole will then have to decide whether to try to override - for which he needs a two-thirds majority.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



Carl Bildt is continuing his contacts in the region. He has recently seen Tudjman and the Krajina Serbs. He saw Chirac on 5 July. He then went on to Mostar and Sarajevo and is in Belgrade today where he will see Milosevic and possibly Mladic. Mr Hurd wrote to Bildt to emphasise the urgency of progress at the Milosevic meeting on the sanctions/recognition package and access for convoys, given the US Senate debate the following week. I enclose a copy of Bildt's reply. He is aware of the urgency of progress on the military as well as the political agenda. Although he is sceptical about the possibilities of a breakthrough this week, we can rely on him to be very persistent in his efforts.

The pressures are thus steadily building and UNPROFOR may be approaching a crisis of credibility. During the coordination meetings between French and British officials, it has been agreed that the present situation of intensified conflict, especially around Sarajevo, and inadequate humanitarian relief would not be sustainable for long and could seriously threaten the viability of UNPROFOR. If Bildt cannot obtain Bosnian Serb assent to the resumption of convoys to Sarajevo and the enclaves, it will be necessary to show that UNPROFOR protected by the RRF can nevertheless ensure the minimum resupply of Sarajevo. The French agree with us that this should be done in a way which maximises the chances of success and minimises the risk of serious confrontation with the Bosnian Serbs. They are in favour, as are the MOD, of using the route over Mount Igman into Sarajevo for a protected convoy. Though this is within range of Bosnian Serb guns, it runs through Bosnian Government controlled territory and thus is capable of being made progressively more secure by suitable deployment of RRF capabilities including artillery.

Action now proceeds on two fronts. Arrangements are in hand for Bildt to visit London on Wednesday 12 July to brief the Contact Group and the Foreign Secretary on his negotiations with Milosevic. Meanwhile, UNPROFOR commanders will be working up operational plans for protected convoying along the Mount Igman route, including RRF assets and close air support as necessary. MOD will be in close touch with General Rupert Smith. His advice on the prospects for success will be important.

The Foreign Secretary is clear that, to ensure the credibility of the RRF and the repeatability of the convoying, the first operation must be successful. We will also need to be mindful of the fact that even

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



successful protected convoying would buy time rather than solutions. Whether it will be right to do this will need to be judged against the risks on the one hand of doing nothing and on the other of engaging in actions which could lead nearer to the edge of events which might precipitate withdrawal. It will be vital to have the views of UN commanders on the ground before final decisions are taken.

The French argue on timing - and we agree - that it would be premature to take decisions on an operation before we know the outcome of the Bildt/Milosevic meeting on 7 July. Assuming he is not sufficiently successful, there will be a strong case for action as soon as possible, showing that the deployment of the RRF has indeed made a difference on the ground. A successful demonstration of increased UNPROFOR capability should help stiffen the will of the US Administration to resist the Dole resolution.

We may therefore be looking at the need for a protected convoy to go over the Mount Igman route the week after next. No doubt the Prime Minister will want to talk to President Chirac before the point of no return is reached. A telephone call some time shortly after Mr Bildt has reported on 12 July could be timely. We shall submit further advice next week.

I am copying this letter to Margaret Aldred (Ministry of Defence) and to Paul Lever and Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever,  
William*

(W G Ehrman)  
Private Secretary

Roderic Lyne Esq CMG  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 0171-21 82111/2/3

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 6/18/5G

7 July 1995

Dear Roderic,


**BOSNIA: 24 AIRMOBILE BRIGADE**

In his letter of 30th June about the deployment of 24 Airmobile Brigade, Mike Venables explained that we were continuing to have difficulty with the Croatian Government about getting the additional troops into theatre. He followed this up with a telephone call last weekend to say that this had prevented the advance party from leaving last Sunday as planned.

The Croatian Government have now given their agreement to the deployment, but the UN has faced financial and contractual problems with the commercial owners of the port of Ploce, where the Brigade is to be based. Following further financial authorisation expected to issue from UN Headquarters today, we hope that these difficulties will be resolved, and the necessary practical arrangements set in place, in the course of next week.

In the meantime, and to take early advantage of the American airlift now available at Brize Norton, we plan to deploy the combat service support group designed to underpin both 24 Airmobile Brigade and the multi-national brigade already forming in theatre. This group comprises some 200 personnel and 40 vehicles. They were due to deploy at a later stage but can be brought forward as they will be based at Split, where facilities are available, rather than at Ploce. They will leave Brize Norton on Sunday (with supporting Royal Engineers flying from Germany to Split tomorrow). We do not propose to offer a press facility for this particular event, though we still intend to do so when the advance party of 24 Airmobile Brigade deploys. On present plans, this will be on or after 12th July (assuming the UN has made the necessary arrangements at Ploce).

R M J Lyne Esq CMG  
10 Downing Street

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Recycled Paper

**CONFIDENTIAL**

These difficulties will inevitably result in a short delay in the full deployment of 24 Airmobile Brigade. We now expect the deployment to be complete by 12th August.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD, and to Melanie Leech and Paul Lever (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever,  
P M Aldred*

(P M ALDRED)  
Private Secretary

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL covering Top Secret  
CAN/AUS/UK/US Eyes only  
Delicate Source UMBRA.

Ref: B.01827

382

MR LYNE

c Miss Leech

BOSNIA

~~c - cm (without attachments)~~

The Prime Minister may like to have this summary of recent events in Bosnia and suggestions for the way forward. I enclose in addition an updated intelligence assessment; and a copy of a paper issued by the JIC on 6 July on the likely consequences should UNPROFOR withdraw.

#### Situation on the Ground

2. The Bosnian army offensive around Sarajevo has continued with varying intensity over the past two weeks. Little ground seems to have changed hands. The Bosnian Serbs have maintained their sporadic shelling of the city. The level of destruction, and civilian casualties, is not as bad as in the worst days of 1992/93. But it is a far, far cry from the atmosphere of tranquillity and hope of spring 1994. Elsewhere in Bosnia fighting has also continued. The air attack on 6 July on a power station near Bihac, which the Foreign Secretary mentioned in Cabinet yesterday, appears to have done less damage than is claimed by the Bosnian authorities. In Croatia there are press stories of Government forces massing for an attack on the northern and southern Krajina enclaves, but our own assessment is that such moves are likely to be part of a strategy by the Croatian Government of keeping the Krajina Serbs under pressure with a view to military action in the autumn rather than now.

#### Convoys/Aid

3. Access for convoys to the enclaves remains extremely patchy. Reports of deaths from starvation in Srebrenica and Bihac cannot be confirmed, but the old, the sick and the very

CONFIDENTIAL



## CONFIDENTIAL

young in areas dependent on UN aid are extremely vulnerable to malnutrition. In the last week French and Dutch UN troops have driven three UNHCR convoys into Sarajevo over Mt Igman delivering 300-400 tonnes of flour. They came under Bosnian Serb fire which they returned.

Rapid Reaction Force

4. The Multi-National Brigade is now in theatre, including the 900 or so additional British personnel, and will be ready for deployment in mid-July. The deployment of 24 Air Mobile Brigade has been delayed somewhat. The Prime Minister originally instructed that the deployment of the main contingent, of some 4,000 troops, should have a firm planning target of end July. It was subsequently agreed that a delay of 7 days was acceptable in order to enable the MOD to use American sea and air lift facilities offered by President Clinton. But the UN have had difficulty in clearing the deployment with the Croatian Government and in Bosnia, where the Muslim-Croat Federation authorities are trying to show their muscle. The Croatian Government have now agreed that 24 Air Mobile Brigade should be based at Ploce, and the advance party will depart this weekend. Efforts continue to clarify the consent of the Bosnian Government over deployment into Bosnia: Zubak has now said that the Federation can agree in principle to allow forces to enter its territory, so the obstacles are gradually being removed.

5. The attempt by Dole and Gingrich to block any American financial contribution to the Rapid Reaction Force has caused a good deal of grief at the UN and may yet have serious long term implications for UN peacekeeping. But it is not holding up the current deployment. The sum authorised by President Clinton falls short of what the USA would pay under the normal assessed contributions formula, and there will be a need for topping up by voluntary contributions.

## CONFIDENTIAL

Bildt

6. Bildt is in Belgrade today hoping to see Gen Mladic as well as Milosevic. His main objectives are to re-establish Bosnian Serb consent to access for convoys, both humanitarian and for the resupply of UNPROFOR; and to conclude the mutual recognition/sanctions relief package with Milosevic which was begun by Ambassador Frasure. It is not known how long he will remain in Belgrade or whether he will see Karadzic at the Bosnia/Serbia border or in Pale.

Events in Washington

7. The Senate will begin to debate Dole's Bill next week. The Bill provides that the arms embargo on Bosnia will be lifted once UNPROFOR have withdrawn, or three months after a request from the Bosnian Government for them to do so, whichever is the earlier. Current estimates are that Dole may secure as many as 70 votes. President Clinton has said that he will exercise his veto if necessary, and even if it were over-ridden by Congress (and it is far from certain that there would be the votes for this) he might challenge the outcome on constitutional grounds. There could therefore be a quite prolonged period of uncertainty.

Contacts with the French

8. The arrangements for close co-ordination with the French which the Prime Minister and President Chirac agreed on in Paris on 10 June are up and running. We have a video conference link with the key French officials every Friday morning. President Chirac is clearly determined that the presence of the Rapid Reaction Force in Bosnia should be used to bring about a qualitative change in UNPROFOR's performance and, in particular, to open up access to Sarajevo. He sometimes talks of forcing open a corridor. The views of French officials on the way ahead are similar to our own:

## CONFIDENTIAL

namely that the UNPROFOR Commanders should be encouraged to develop plans for ensuring better protection of the access route to Sarajevo over Mt Igman by putting in place certain military assets (notably artillery) of the Multi-National Brigade and being prepared to use them, in a proportionate and moderate way, if the Bosnian Serbs attack the convoys. Such dispositions will need to be made next week if Bildt does not succeed in securing from the Bosnian Serbs bankable assurances about access. It will be helpful, in terms of the debate in Washington, for UNPROFOR to be able to show that the availability of a rapid reaction capability is already delivering results. It is less clear whether a similar approach can be applied to the enclaves.

9. But the French remain mistrustful of the Americans. They have warned us that if UNPROFOR is forced out of Bosnia as a result of purely American decisions, there would be a crisis in French/American relations of Suez-like proportions. And they do not have confidence in the judgement of Admiral Smith (CINCSOUTH) or Gen Joulwan (SACEUR) who would be the key figures in any NATO operation to protect UNPROFOR's withdrawal.

Pressure Points

10. The potential pressure points over the coming weeks, other than the ever present possibility of unacceptable developments on the ground, are:

- the risk that President Chirac will demand more forceful action by UNPROFOR than we judge prudent, eg an armed convoy spectacular on Bastille Day (14 July). There may be a case for the Prime Minister to speak to Chirac by telephone once the outcome of Bildt's current discussions is known;

## CONFIDENTIAL

- the risk that passage of a resolution by the US Senate will be interpreted by the parties as implying that UNPROFOR withdrawal is imminent and will cause them to take pre-emptive military action to secure their positions. We may need therefore to put pressure on the US Administration to reiterate publicly their support for the continuation of UNPROFOR's mission;
- the possibility that the Bosnian Government will formally ask for UNPROFOR's withdrawal. If they show signs of doing so we may need to tell them bluntly that if UNPROFOR leaves they cannot expect any military support from NATO, eg air strikes in pursuing the war;
- the possibility that the Bosnian Serbs or the Bosnian Government, or both, will seek to frustrate the replacement of our contingent in Gorazde, and of the Dutch in Srebrenica, by the Ukrainians.

*We would come under intense M.D. pressure to mount air strikes.*

OPD Meeting


11. The Prime Minister may wish to consider holding a meeting of OPD on Bosnia before the summer break. 20 July is a possibility though there is a potential clash after Cabinet with EDI(P). Issues to be addressed are:

- endorsement of a general concept of operations for the Rapid Reaction Force, ie an understanding of how we expect it to be used and what level of risk we would be prepared for the UNPROFOR Commanders to accept in its deployment;

## CONFIDENTIAL

- a decision will be required in late August or early September on whether to proceed with the deployment of the remainder of 24 Air Mobile Brigade, who on present plans will be held in the UK but capable of arriving in theatre within 7 days. The Chancellor of the Exchequer in his letter to the Defence Secretary of 3 July expressed concern about the nature and extent of the military commitment as it is developing and the hope that OPD will be able to consider the full range of options, including withdrawing the reinforcements if their presence is no longer essential, before deciding on the final stage of deployment;
  
- a review of the diplomatic prospects in the light of Bildt's initial exchanges with the parties. If the omens for a political settlement on the basis of the current proposals remain poor, are we content for Bildt just to soldier on or are there any new elements which could be introduced into the equation (a new map; a conference; a deadline)?

12. If the Prime Minister is content, we might commission papers from the FCO and MOD covering these three points.



PAUL LEVER

7 July 1995

**CONFIDENTIAL - PERSONAL***Rod/L. Real dangers here.**Pl. or her before**calling a meeting.**19.7***From: RODERIC LYNE****Date: 7 July 1995****PRIME MINISTER****cc: MR. OAKDEN  
MR. MEYER****BOSNIA**

To update you (and serve as background when David Owen calls for a drink on Monday evening), I attach a comprehensive sitrep by Paul Lever, together with two JIC Assessments and an MOD letter explaining a short delay (to 12 August) in completion of the air mobile brigade deployment.

**Action Points**

- Pl. Lever*
- **OPD:** I am sure that we should have an OPD discussion before the summer break, to take stock of this pretty complex situation and in particular to review the role and length of deployment of the Rapid Reaction Force. (The Chancellor is not happy about the RRF, and has already asked for an OPD discussion.) I have suggested to MOD that it would be a good thing if the new Defence Secretary were able to visit Bosnia before the meeting. (Perhaps he should be accompanied by Nicholas Bonsor, who is now the relevant FCO Minister of State.) We have provisionally made arrangements for an OPD after Cabinet on Thursday, 20 July. **Content to confirm this meeting?**
- Yes*

*Kisrafak*

- **Plans for RRF-protected convoys to Sarajevo:** Carl Bildt is meeting Milosevic and possibly Mladic in Belgrade today. He will be pressing for Serb agreement to a land route to Sarajevo. The JIC doubt if the Serbs will give this. UNPROFOR are therefore

**CONFIDENTIAL - PERSONAL**

CONFIDENTIAL - PERSONAL

*heads,  
Devon + Bonnets,*

- 2 -

working up a plan to send convoys protected by the RRF into Sarajevo over the Mount Igman track. This runs through Bosnian-controlled territory, but within range of Bosnian Serb guns. The artillery we have supplied would be used to help protect the convoy, together with close air support. The French are very keen on such an operation, and will try to force the pace if Bildt comes back without Serb agreement. Malcolm Rifkind has not yet formed a clear view. He wants to be confident that the first operation would be successful, and to know more about the views of UN commanders on the ground - given the risk of triggering a chain reaction which could lead towards withdrawal. The FCO assume that you would wish to discuss this by telephone with Chirac before the point of no return is reached. (We would also need to consider bringing the OPD meeting forward if necessary);

- **Bildt:** is due in London next Wednesday, 12 July, to brief the Contact Group and the Foreign Secretary: I suggest we leave open the possibility of a meeting with you until we know more about the situation. You should not have to see him every time he passes through London, but a meeting could be useful if we are heading into trouble;

- **bilateral with the Foreign Secretary:** whether or not you see Bildt, your 12 July bilateral with Malcolm Rifkind will provide an opportunity for an update.

*Roderic Lyne*  
Roderic Lyne

fbildt.as

CONFIDENTIAL - PERSONAL

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

MRM  
cc CM  
EO

From the Private Secretary

7 July 1995

*John Saw,*

## FRANCE/BOSNIA

As I told you on the telephone, Levitte telephoned this morning.

On Bosnia, he said that Chirac would be speaking at 1930 this evening to Milosevic. Levitte promised to brief me on the outcome. The aim of the phone call was to reinforce the message which Carl Bildt would be giving Milosevic this afternoon, that a reliable land route must be opened to Sarajevo.

Levitte said Chirac had seen Bildt in Geneva on Wednesday, and had discussed land routes to Sarajevo with him then. The French Ambassador in Belgrade had been instructed to make the position clear to Milosevic yesterday. The French message was that their preference would be for the Serbs to agree to the opening of the Western route from Kiseljak to Sarajevo. This would require Serb assurance that the route could be kept open over the longer term. The alternative would be to keep the Igman track open. This was second-best in terms of quality. The French were arguing that it was not such a good option from the Serb point of view: as the route passed through Bosnian territory, it tended to make UNPROFOR appear to be aligned with the Bosnians. But it was for the Serbs to choose which of these options they preferred, though, one way or the other, a route must be opened.

Comment

Although I would not read too much into it, at no point during our conversation did Levitte mention the possible need to use force to open a land route. I imagine that may be something the French are keeping in reserve until they see how Milosevic and Mladic (who they hope will be at the meeting this afternoon with Bildt) react to the démarche.

*MS*

CONFIDENTIAL



**CONFIDENTIAL**

- 2 -

The French obsession with Sarajevo is such that Levitte did not mention any other aspect of the situation in Bosnia or the looming trouble in Croatia.

I am copying this letter by facsimile to Sir Christopher Mallaby (Paris) and sending copies also to Margaret Aldred (Ministry of Defence), Paul Lever and Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

*yours ever,*

*Roderic Lyne*

**RODERIC LYNE**

Sam Sharpe Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

**CONFIDENTIAL**

06/07/1995 10:23 071-2733965

HOME SECRETARY

PAGE 02



Prime Minister

To see

Rath

QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

6 JUL 1995

Dear Prime Minister

As you know, Irma Hadzimuratovic, the young girl who was evacuated from Sarajevo after your personal intervention so that she could receive urgent medical treatment, died in Great Ormond Street Hospital on 1 April.

There have been several misleading press reports which have suggested that, as a result, action might be taken to return her family to Bosnia. Not surprisingly, these have generated representations from a number of MPs and members of the public. In fact, Irma's father and sister were not at risk of being required to return to Bosnia, as it is not our policy to return anybody to an area of active conflict.

Irma's father and surviving sister Medina have applied to be allowed to remain in the United Kingdom permanently. This application would normally fall to be refused under the Immigration Rules. But the circumstances surrounding this case are clearly out of the ordinary. Furthermore, any decision to refuse the family settlement would be likely to attract adverse media interest, and, even with sensitive handling, I cannot see us winning any ensuing public relations battle. I have therefore concluded that Mr Hadzimuratovic and Medina should exceptionally be allowed to settle here.

I am drawing this decision to your attention because of your earlier personal involvement.

Yours  
Michael Howard

MICHAEL HOWARD

The Rt Hon John Major MP  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON SW1

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

United Nations Peace Forces Headquarters  
Siege des Forces de Paix des Nations Unies  
Zagreb

Special Representative of the Secretary-General  
for the Former Yugoslavia

5 July 1995

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

Today's news came as no surprise to me. I was, nevertheless, delighted to hear of your resounding re-election as leader of the Conservative Party.

The support of the government of the United Kingdom has been of enormous value to UNPROFOR, and your personal commitment to our work has given me added strength in the performance of my various duties on behalf of the Secretary-General.

I hope it will not be too long before we meet again; I have very happy memories of our dinner in Split last year.

With warmest personal regards.

Yours sincerely,

*Yasushi Akashi*  
Yasushi Akashi

The Rt. Hon. John Major, MP  
Prime Minister  
United Kingdom of Great Britain  
and Northern Ireland  
London

*MJR* *W. W. W. W.*  
*na*  
*(UNID are submitting this)*  
*WJ 6/7*

TOTAL P.02

~~cc - Press~~  
MA.



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 0171-21 82111/2/3

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 6/18/5G

5<sup>16</sup> July 1995

RL K.

Dear Robert,

60/7

**BOSNIA AND THE GULF: PARLIAMENTARY BULLETIN**

I attach the next of our regular bulletins on the activities of British forces in Bosnia and the Gulf. This will be placed in the Library of each House tomorrow at 15.30.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD and to the Minister of Overseas Development, to Dugald Sandeman (Lord President's Office) to Murdo Maclean (Chief Whip's Office) and to Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

Yours  
Mollie

(MOLLIE FIELD)  
Private Secretary

R M J Lyne Esq CMG  
10 Downing Street



Recycled Paper

EVENTS IN YUGOSLAVIA AND IRAQ - ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

5 July 1995

The Former Yugoslavia

hoys? || - The phased deployment of 24 Airmobile Brigade is scheduled to begin this week with an advance party of over 400 personnel due to depart shortly. Logistics and engineer personnel will follow to prepare the infrastructure to support the deployment of the main body. It is planned to have completed the deployment of over 4,000 troops by early August. The Brigade will form a major part of the UN's Rapid Reaction Force, which already includes BRITBAT 1, recently reinforced by 19 Field Regiment Royal Artillery and other assets. ||

- BRITFOR continues to help monitor the activities of the warring factions along the confrontation lines in Bosnia. In Sarajevo, a 70-strong British Army mortar locating troop equipped with Cymbeline mortar locating radar continues to monitor such activities around the city. 6 Army Lynx helicopters are now operating in Bosnia as part of our additional contribution to UNPROFOR.

- The UNHCR humanitarian airlift into Sarajevo is still suspended. The total amount of aid delivered by the RAF Hercules remains at 23,943 tonnes.

- 4 RN Sea Kings remain at Divulje Barracks, Split, with 2 permanently on stand-by for casualty evacuation.

- The Royal Navy Task Group comprising HMS ILLUSTRIOUS, HMS BOXER and RFAs FORT AUSTIN and OLNA are on operations in the Adriatic.

- RFA RESOURCE remains in Split harbour providing accommodation and stores support to BRITFOR.

- HMS GLASGOW and HMS BATTLEAXE continue, as part of NATO's Standing Naval Forces Atlantic and Mediterranean respectively, to conduct stop and search operations in the Adriatic in support of the UN arms embargo and trade sanctions. The next detachment of two RAF Nimrod MPA aircraft deployed to Sigonella in Sicily, to support this operation, on 21 June. The detachment is due to end on 6 July.
- 8 RAF Jaguars are on stand-by at Gioia del Colle, Italy, as part of the NATO capability for air operations over Bosnia. 4 Jaguars remain on stand by in the UK.
- RAF Sentry E3D, Tornado F3 aircraft, and Sea Harriers embarked on HMS ILLUSTRIOUS, together with Tristar air-to-air refuelling support, continue to play their part in NATO NFZ operations.

#### The Gulf

- Reconnaissance sorties by RAF Tornados in northern and southern Iraq, as part of coalition action in support of UN Security Council Resolution 688, continue on a routine basis.

#### Key

UNHCR	UN High Commission for Refugees
BRITFOR	British Forces
UNPROFOR	UN Protection Force
RFA	Royal Fleet Auxiliary
MPA	Maritime Patrol Aircraft
NFZ	No Fly Zone

RESTRICTED

140122  
MDADAN 7953**ADVANCE COPY***u*  
(mainly for §2)*60<sup>5</sup>/7*

RESTRICTED  
 FM UKDEL NATO  
 TO DESKBY 060630Z FCO  
 TELNO 321  
 OF 051158Z JULY 95  
 INFO DESKBY 051930Z WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK  
 INFO IMMEDIATE OTHER FORMER YUGOSLAVIA POSTS, CABINET OFFICE, MODUK  
 INFO IMMEDIATE JHQ SALISBURY, ACTOR

SIC A2P/I9G

JHQ FOR POLAD

NOT FOR ICFY

YOUR TELNO 98

SUBJECT: BOSNIA/CROATIA: NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL: 5 JULY 1995

## SUMMARY

1. Further briefing on air defence threat and Serb integrated air defence system. Substantive discussion of Deny Flight effectiveness deferred until 12 July, in the light of new proposals from SACEUR. Decisions on enhancement of NATO-UN liaison also deferred. Akashi to meet NAC on 19 July, possibly accompanied by Janvier and Smith. Turkish marker on lift.

## DETAIL

## BOSNIAN SERB AIR DEFENCE THREAT

2. Ray (Deputy Chairman, Military Committee) provided further information on the capability of the Bosnian Serb air defence system and its links to Belgrade. Connectivity still existed, although the Bosnian Serb part of the system could be operated independently even if links were severed. It had the capability to detect NATO aircraft taking off in Italy and from aircraft carriers in the Adriatic, and to give direction to missile batteries. Radar illumination would only be required for a very short time before firing, and there would therefore be very little time for NATO aircraft to take evasive action, even if they were accompanied by SEAD capable escorts. Because of this, NATO aircraft were now not normally flying in areas threatened by SAMs. There was no evidence

PAGE 1  
RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

140122  
MDADAN 7953

that Belgrade was involved in command and control of Bosnian Serb SAMs.

3. I said that Ray's briefing, which was timely, broadly agreed with our assessment.

#### OPERATION DENY FLIGHT

4. Ray reported that work in the Military Committee on the draft proposals to enhance Operation Deny Flight (IMSWM-KAA-174-95 of 30 June, faxed to London) had been stopped following the new operational analysis and recommendations from SHAPE (outlined in TUR). SACEUR had been invited to submit his revised assessment and proposals in writing. Once these were received, a revised Military Committee Memorandum would be discussed and forwarded to the NAC for its meeting on 12 July.

5. I said that there needed to be a clear separation between aspects related to the enforcement of the No Fly Zone and the question of wider support for UNPF. Regarding the latter, it would be important not to make too many assumptions about the requirements of the RRF. It would also be useful to have information about the extent to which the threat had changed and Deny Flight had been downscaled. I hoped that clear options to improve the effectiveness of Operation Deny Flight would be proposed, including any necessary changes to Rules of Engagement. It should be made clear whether the proposals fell within the scope of existing UN and NAC authorisations. We would need to avoid compromising progress on the political track. Andreani (France) supported, and added that there was always a certain level of risk inherent in such an operation. Jannuzzi (Italy) said that NATO was not obliged to fulfil UN mandates if they were too difficult or dangerous.

#### UN-NATO LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS

6. Andreani said that he could not approve the proposals contained in PO(95)121 of 27 June (faxed to London and New York) today. There was no overwhelming requirement for new posts at the moment. A political framework governing relations with the UN in the context of the withdrawal operation should be produced by the Political Committee before the NAC could take a decision. The UNPF Liaison Officer should be located at NATO HQ in Brussels rather than at SHAPE. Jannuzzi supported. I said that the existing arrangement for NATO Military Liaison Officers in New York was inefficient and

PAGE 2  
RESTRICTED



RESTRICTED

140122  
MDADAN 7953

expensive. We supported lengthening the tour of duty, but favoured a six month or longer posting. I noted that Boutros Ghali had asked for the UNPF Liaison Officer to be located at SHAPE. I suggested, with support from Hunter (US), that the Political Committee should be asked to report by 12 July. Veenendaal (Netherlands) said that the time was not yet right to send an IS Liaison Officer to New York. Bierring (Denmark) and Mevik (Norway) said that they could have approved the proposals today. Claes (Secretary General) concluded that the Political Committee should prepare a document before 12 July setting out the political framework in which enhanced liaison should take place.

## OPLAN 40104 FINANCING

7. Responding to a request from Rens (Belgium), Ray said that the latest mission budget estimate (June 1995) assumed total force numbers (for a worst case scenario) of 110,000, which was 40,000 more than had been assumed in January 1995. This increase was partly due to the inclusion of all forces in theatre and Italy (including 20,000 personnel assigned to UNCRO, UNPREDEP, Deny Flight and Sharp Guard). The increase in the overall budget estimate (ie including national costs) from 1.9 billion US Dollars in January 1995 to 3.2 billion US Dollars in June 1995 reflected these manpower increases. Van Foreest (ASG, Logistics) reported that he was seeking to arrange a further technical discussion in New York in the near future to establish an agreed basis for drawing up a mission budget. I asked that the NAC be kept fully updated on budget estimates and contacts with New York.

## MEETING WITH AKASHI, JANVIER AND SMITH

8. Claes reported that Akashi had suggested a meeting with the NAC before the summer break. He was likely to be accompanied by General Janvier, and perhaps also General Smith. Claes proposed that this meeting be arranged for 19 July (the last NAC before the summer break). This was agreed.

## ARMS EMBARGO

9. Ozceri (Turkey), on instructions, recalled Turkey's long standing opposition to the arms embargo against Bosnia and said that the possibility of lift would need to be discussed before Oplan 40104 was finally approved.

PAGE 3  
RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

1401  
MDADAN 7953

GOULDEN

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

28

ADVANCE

28 *(24)*

.YUGOSLAVIA

2 PS

PS/MR HOGG

PS/PUS

MISS NEVILLE-JONES

MR F RICHARDS

MR SMITH

MR RICHARDSON

~~EAU//HD~~

CFSP UNIT//HD

MR EHRMAN *Mr. Charlton*

2 UND//HD

RESIDENT CLERK

2 PS/PM

MOD//RS/PUS

CAOFF//MR LEVER

MOD//GS SEC/C DAVENPORT

CAOFF//MISS COLLINS

SECPOL D//MR ASTLE

SECPOL D//MR REID

CAOFF//FILBY AIR CDR

MOD//MR OMAND DUS P

MOD//AUS(C)/MR HAWTIN

*(Signature)*

NNNN

PAGE 4  
RESTRICTED



CONFIDENTIAL

136340  
MDHIAN 3478

CONFIDENTIAL  
FM STOCKHOLM  
TO DESKBY 050800Z FCO  
TELNO 269  
OF 050716Z JULY 95

PERSONAL FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY AND DARROCH, EAU

SUBJECT: FORMER YUGOSLAVIA/CARL BILDT

Following is a "Personal and Confidential" message to the Secretary of State from Carl Bildt:

BEGINS

1. Many thanks for your message, which I received upon reaching Geneva mid-day Tuesday.
2. I fully share your assessment concerning the gravity of the situation. There are dark clouds on the horizon on the political as well as military front at the moment.
3. On the military front we cannot exclude a more dramatic confrontation over access to Sarajevo along the Igman Route. Although the risks inherent in this are obvious, I see no way in which the UN can back down from the more robust stand taken by the French battalion against Serb shelling during the last few days.
4. This impacts directly on the situation in the United States, which is now directly affecting the behaviour of primarily the Bosnian government side. Foreign Minister Sacerbey will be in New York and Washington all this week trying to influence the situation, and it is obvious that they are counting on the UN being humiliated on the ground as a way of increasing support taken by Senator Dole and others.
5. In a personal capacity, I have talked with senator Lugar on how I see things developing and what impact the Dole actions are having in the area itself. He understands and generally will be helpful in trying to avert utter disaster on Capitol Hill, and I have offered to come over and privately brief himself and others in the Senate on how I see the situation. Needless to say, Holbrooke is informed of these contacts.

PAGE 1  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

136340  
MDHIAN 3478

6. After going to Mostar Wednesday evening and spending the night there, I will proceed to Sarajevo over the Igman Route on Thursday. The Bosnian Serbs are certainly going to be aware of this - there is no such thing as secure communications in UNPROFOR - and although Mladic through Milosevic has said that he guaranteed my security the last time, they have made their displeasure with me going in like this known.

7. With President Izetbegovic I intend to take up their long-term strategy in relation to the UN effort. Recent treatment of Akashi as well as obvious harassment of UN efforts - supply convoys to the Swedish forces in Tuzla are now also held up - fits well into a picture that short term might be geared towards influencing the battle for Capitol Hill but which also has grave long-term implications even for the survival of the Bosnian state.

8. On Friday I will be in Belgrade, and I have sent a message to Milosevic through British channels concerning the possibility of Mladic being there. I certainly will address the military issues during this meeting, but I am under no illusions concerning the possibilities of a deal/breakthrough this early. He will try to test me/us further before he will be ready to make a deal.

9. I would also guess that it will take some time for them to assess a situation that is changing also from their perspective, and it is obvious that there is increasing pressure on him to support the military efforts both in Bosnia and in the Krajinas.

10. It is my aim on Friday to get somewhat closer concerning the sanction reimposition formula, as well as on the military issues. I have then reserved the entire later part of the following week for discussions in Belgrade in order to explore all options before the reaction force becomes ready and before the Foreign Affairs Council in Brussels.

11. Please give my sincere congratulations to the Prime Minister.

ENDS

Please Advance to EAU.

CORMACK

PAGE 2  
CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED

132417  
MDADAN 7685

ADVANCE COPY

RESTRICTED  
 FM WASHINGTON  
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
 TELNO 1612  
 OF 032153Z JULY 95  
 INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, BONN, MODUK  
 INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO, BELGRADE, ZAGREB, SARAJEVO  
 INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, CABINET OFFICE, UKMIS GENEVA  
 INFO PRIORITY ACTOR, WHIRL

File

SIC A3A

MY TELNO 1604 AND UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 2128

SUBJECT: BOSNIA: UNPROFOR REINFORCEMENTS

## SUMMARY

1. Clinton stands by his decision on US assistance to the RRF. Americans unwilling to accept UN assessed contributions of more than USD 35m. We argue strongly that they must not artificially compress the assessment on others.

## DETAIL

2. The President has now replied to the latest Dole/Gingrich broadside. Clinton (letter faxed to FCO and UKMIS) says that:

- the US must support its allies and UNPROFOR's continued presence. The alternatives are worse. The decision to provide support and funding for the RRF is in the national interest: he will stand by it.

- It is the allies who will deploy the RRF forces, bear most of the burden and take most of the risks. The US has nevertheless gained agreement that financing should not be done on the usual basis. The President has agreed "partial US funding using existing assessments of USD 35m - less than 8% of total estimated RRF costs" because that meets US obligations under UNPROFOR force ceilings agreed previously.

- The Administration would never subject US military personnel to unnecessary danger (a response to Congressional concern at

PAGE 1  
 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

132417  
MDADAN 7685

the BSA SAM threat). SEAD packages are now part of every Deny Flight mission. NATO aircraft have authority to respond without UN approval if SAM sites show hostile intent. The US will insist on "strong measures" to protect its personnel participating in NFZ enforcement and other air operations.

3. We have taken up the latest US funding problem (second TUR) with State (EUR and the UN Bureau), NSC (Vershbow) and Pentagon (OSD). We argued that the US had agreed to fund by regular assessed contributions those RRF troops which could be accommodated within the previous headroom. The Secretariat had now calculated that just over 5,000 could be so accommodated at a cost of some USD 185m for troops, equipment and common costs. We could not accept US efforts to compress the Secretariat's figures artificially in order to keep the US assessed liability at USD 35m only. This would further increase our own financial burden and risked delaying RRF deployment. We therefore hoped the US would let the budget go forward as prepared by the Secretariat and accept an assessment above USD 35m. Whether the US subsequently paid USD 35m or more was a separate issue: the key point was that they should not block a budget providing for a higher assessment.

4. Vershbow subsequently contacted us to say that accepting a higher assessment would cause the Administration real problems. The President was publicly committed to the USD 35m figure. His letter had reconfirmed this to Congress. If the Administration now accepted a higher liability Congress would accuse them of duplicity and accepting an unfairly large US contribution (sic). The Administration had never accepted that the common costs of RRF troops funded under the old "headroom" authority should be subject to assessed contributions. The US would therefore insist on a recalculation of the assessment, and stripping out of the common costs.

5. We said that we and the other troop contributors would take this ill. The effect would be to penalize further those who, as Clinton had noted, were already taking on most of the risks and costs. Vershbow said the US had no wish to prevent the UK and others receiving the maximum possible reimbursement from others via assessed contributions. If a way could be found to achieve this without the US being billed for more than USD 35m, the Administration would gladly support. But he acknowledged that this would be difficult.

PAGE 2  
RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

1324  
MDADAN 7685

## 6. Yugoslavia Main Distribution.

RENWICK

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 28ADVANCE 28

.YUGOSLAVIA

2 PS

PS/MR HOGG

PS/PUS

MISS NEVILLE-JONES

MR F RICHARDS

MR SMITH

MR RICHARDSON

~~EAU//HD~~

CFSP UNIT//HD

~~MR EHRMAN~~ *Mr. Charlton*

2 UND//HD

RESIDENT CLERK

2 PS/PM

MOD//PS/PUS

CAOFF//MR LEVER

MOD//GS SEC/C DAVENPORT

CAOFF//MISS COLLINS

SECPOL D//MR ASTLE

SECPOL D//MR REID

CAOFF//FILBY AIR CDR

MOD//MR OMAND DUS P

MOD//AUS(C)/MR HAWTIN

NNNN

PAGE 3  
RESTRICTED

chex.jp/nm2/29.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, London, SW1P 3AG  
0171-270 5000

3 July 1995

Rt Hon Malcolm Rifkind QC MP  
Secretary of State for Defence  
Ministry of Defence  
Main Building  
Whitehall  
LONDON  
SW1A 2HB

MF 1 week  
RC 3/4

W<sup>3</sup>/<sub>4</sub>

*Dear Malcolm,*

BOSNIA

I have seen your minute of 19 June to the Prime Minister about the arrangements for deploying the reinforcements for UNPROFOR, and the replies from No.10 and Douglas Hurd.

I am concerned about the way this is turning out. What started as a response to a crisis has turned into something which looks much more like a permanent increase in our commitment to UNPROFOR, which will be difficult to reverse. I find the reference in your minute to the possibility of roulement particularly disturbing, as it opens up the possibility of keeping 24 Airmobile Brigade in Bosnia for more than six months.

I can understand the practical and logistical factors which have caused difficulty in sending the whole force to Bosnia immediately. But I hope that the threat to UNPROFOR will be monitored carefully over the next few weeks, and that we can maintain the position that the troops are there to respond to a particular security situation, which is expected to be temporary. I would not like to see them become so integrated into the UNPROFOR structure that they could not be withdrawn in any circumstance short of a full-scale withdrawal.



CONFIDENTIAL



When we consider the final stage of deployment in August or September, I hope we will be able to consider the full range of options, including withdrawing the reinforcements if their presence is no longer essential on military grounds.

On the question of funding, under the Armstrong Formula the marginal cost of troops taking part in international peace-keeping is borne by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. We are discussing peace-keeping funding more widely. However, I can confirm that I will meet the 1995-96 costs of the additional peace-keeping troops (both 19 Field Regiment and 24 Airmobile Brigade) from the Reserve.

I am copying this letter to other members of OPD and to Sir Robin Butler.

+ not the MOD underpend.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'J. M. L.' with a flourish.

KENNETH CLARKE

CONFIDENTIAL

127577  
MDHIAN 3160

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BELGRADE

TO DESKBY 020730Z FCO

TELNO 402

OF 011948Z JULY 95

AND TO DESKBY 021300Z WASHINGTON

AND TO DESKBY 020830Z PARIS, BONN, MADRID

INFO DESKBY 020830Z MOSCOW

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, UKMIS GENEVA, ZAGREB, SARAJEVO

INFO IMMEDIATE WHIRL, ACTOR, UKDEL VIENNA

SIC : U2L/UAJ/UXG/KEJ

JHQ FOR POLAD

RESIDENT CLERK PLEASE PASS TO PRIVATE SECRETARY, MISS NEVILLE-JONES  
AND CHARLTON

SUBJECT: BILDT/MILOSEVIC: RECOGNITION PACKAGE

## SUMMARY

1. Bildt stresses need for rapid progress on political and military fronts. Queries use of integrated air defence systems and mobilisation of refugees. Milosevic looks for "critical mass" of elements in recognition package. Bildt to devise possible formulae. But stresses that recognition must be accompanied by rapid progress on the ground. Believe Milosevic ready to deal.

## DETAIL

2. Below is Carl Bildt's assessment of his second meeting with Milosevic.

3. For Bonn, Paris, Washington, Madrid: Grateful if you would pass this to relevant MFA Political Directors as soon as possible.

Begins

4. On 1 July I spent almost nine hours with Milosevic at his villa outside Belgrade. Austin and Milinovic (Milosevic's chef de cabinet) were also present.

PAGE 1  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

127577  
MDHIAN 3160

5. I began by stressing that time was critical. If there was no progress on the political front within weeks rather than months then Bosnia risked going belly up. If the situation on the ground did not improve then UNPROFOR may have no option but to withdraw (a nightmare scenario). Congressional pressure and forthcoming elections in the US were reducing Clinton's room for manoeuvre on a recognition package. The arms embargo may be lifted. For all these reasons we had to move fast. And political progress must be accompanied by an improvement on the ground. UNPROFOR had to have freedom of movement and humanitarian aid had to get through to Sarajevo and the enclaves as a matter of urgency. Sarajevo could not suffer a fourth winter under siege. If negotiations failed to open a land route to Sarajevo then the Bosnian government would continue its military efforts to relieve the siege.

6. Milosevic countered that the Muslims would fail if they tried to break the siege. Mladic, who had been in Belgrade on 30 June, had been very confident. Initially, Milosevic did not appear concerned by the time factor but I believe took the point as I kept referring back to it.

7. I said that the integrated air defence system had raised doubts as to whether Milosevic was still helping Pale. I also brought up the FRY's help in mobilising refugees to fight in the Krajinas and Bosnia. Milosevic simply commented that allegations over air defences were nothing new and that regarding refugees, all the FRY had done was round up 2-3,000 criminals who had no right to live in Serbia.

8. Discussion then turned to the recognition package. The major sticking point was not surprisingly the sanctions reimposition formula although Milosevic also raised the oil regime (not likely to be a problem), his preference for the EU list of strategic goods and frozen assets. Milosevic said that the Nordwijk formula was unacceptable. He accused the Americans of backtracking on what he had agreed with Frasure. He had made all the concessions he could. Any more concessions would cripple the package. He needed to have a critical mass of factors to enable him to sell the package to the Serbs on both sides of the Drina. There had to be a mechanism whereby suspension was not reliant on the arbitrary behaviour of one state. Why could not the international community trust the UN Security Council or Secretary General? The US need not fear a Russian veto: after all, Russia had not vetoed resolutions imposing sanctions on the FRY.

PAGE 2  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

127577  
MDHIAN 3160

9. I said that Milosevic's most recent formula would not run. But I accepted the critical mass point and agreed that one country should not be able to reimpose sanctions unilaterally. Nevertheless I would have to be able to sell the formula in Washington. I spent some time trying to get him to agree to possible parameters for reimposition formula which would not make it possible for any one country to arbitrarily reimpose sanctions but would at the same time avoid the possibility of another country blocking the reimposition of sanctions if there was a good case to be made for it. He reluctantly accepted those parameters and I undertook to look at/devise possible formulae based on this which would at the same time give Milosevic his critical mass and satisfy the international community and then return to him with it.

10. However, I said that a deal on recognition was not enough in itself. It had to be accompanied by a real improvement on the ground, especially on access to Sarajevo. Milosevic said that once a deal was reached, he would need only two weeks to pull Serb opinion (in both the FRY and Bosnia) behind him and force Karadzic and Krajisnik to the negotiating table. Access to Sarajevo could be negotiated then. I said that that was not enough. Izetbegovic would be reluctant to call off his offensive and negotiate until after the siege had been lifted.

PALE

11. Milosevic was very dismissive of the two Ks. They did not want to negotiate. Karadzic would lie to me, break all his promises and refuse to get down to specific negotiations. That is why Pale must be by-passed. Milosevic kept coming back to his theme of "Come to me. I think we can achieve peace. Just give me sufficient critical mass". Milosevic hoped that Mladic would not be a problem but could not guarantee it.

COMMENT

12. My main aim of the meeting was to bring the critical time factor home to him. I believe that we ended the meeting with him being more aware of the urgency of the matter than he was at the beginning of the meeting. I also wanted to make clear to him that success on the package was not enough in order to prevent things sliding away into disaster but that there must be rapid progress on the ground primarily around Sarajevo but also the enclaves. This

PAGE 3  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

127577  
MDHIAN 3160

seemed to be news to him and he was somewhat reluctant to see that linkage.

13. I believe that Milosevic is ready to deal. My task now is to find a suitable formula for sanctions reimposition. With that in the bag the rest should follow. But Milosevic's insistence that once he has his "critical mass" Pale will rapidly sue for peace in asking the international community to take a lot on trust. But he is absolutely convinced that he can achieve this.

14. Milosevic's mood fluctuated during the meeting. He was by and large a genial and charming host but got very agitated when the conversation turned to Kosovo (which he insisted Serbia would never give up, not even at the cost of 1,000 years excommunication). He showed typical Serb traits: a selective view of history emphasising wrongs done to them, a victim complex ("why does the world continue to punish this little country?", "I was naive towards the Bosnian Serbs"). Milosevic also contradicted himself on more than one occasion when speaking about the Bosnian Muslims. He described Izetbegovic as "sensible, moderate" and later as "extremist and fundamentalist". Muslims were "good people" but who "don't care about human life".

15. I agreed to meet Milosevic again at 1400 hrs on 7 July. I will not be surprised if he brings Mladic along to that meeting.

16. Yugoslavia limited distribution.

ROBERTS

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

54

MAIN

32

.YUGOSLAVIA LIMITED  
SINGLE COPIES  
EAU//HD  
EAU//ASST HD  
EAU//HD POLICY  
EAU//HD OPERATIONS

MR SMITH  
MR RICHARDSON  
MR CHARLTON  
CFSP UNIT//HD  
EUD(E)//HD  
PUSD//HD

PAGE 4  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

125764  
MDHIAN 3105

CONFIDENTIAL  
FM WASHINGTON  
TO DESKBY 301500Z FCO  
TELNO 1595  
OF 301425Z JUNE 95  
AND TO DESKBY 301445Z MODUK  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS GENEVA  
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, BELGRADE, SARAJEVO  
INFO IMMEDIATE ZAGREB, UKREP BRUSSELS, CABINET OFFICE  
INFO IMMEDIATE ACTOR, WHIRL

SIC A3A/A2P

SUBJECT: BOSNIA: U.S. POLICY

1. HOLBROOKE CONTACTED ME THIS MORNING TO SAY THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS REPLIED TO DOLE AND GINGRICH REJECTING THEIR ARGUMENTS AND STATING THAT HE WILL GO AHEAD WITH LOGISTIC AND OTHER SUPPORT FOR THE RAPID REACTION FORCE.

2. HOLBROOKE SAID THIS LEFT TWO PROBLEMS:

(A) AS IT WOULD BE OPERATING UNDER THE SAME ROE, THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS REMAINED SCEPTICAL THAT THE RRF WOULD BE ABLE TO INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF UNPROFOR.

(B) THERE WAS A REALLY SERIOUS PROBLEM OVER THE BOSNIAN SERB AIR DEFENCES. THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP CONTENTED THAT THE FAILURE TO SUPPRESS THESE WAS RESULTING IN A SHARPLY INCREASED RISK TO ALLIED PILOTS AND, PROBABLY, AN INABILITY TO CONTINUE TO ENFORCE THE NO FLY ZONE. THE ADMINISTRATION SHARED THESE CONCERNS.

RENWICK

YYYY

PAGE 1  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

12576  
MDHIAN 5DISTRIBUTION

159

MAIN 110

YUGOSLAVIA

EAU

ADDITIONAL 49

CAOFF//MR GALSWORTHY  
 CAOFF//FILBY AIR CDR  
 CAOFF//MR C BLACK  
 CAOFF//MR GOULD  
 CAOFF//LYALL-GRANT  
 CAOFF//MR TALLANTIRE  
 CAOFF//MR WILLIAMS J  
 CAOFF//MISS COLLINS  
 MOD//PS/DEFENCE SEC  
 MOD//PS/PUS  
 MOD//HD DI(EUR)POL 3  
 MOD//MR OMAND DUS P  
 MOD//MR MANSON  
 MOD//GS SEC/C DAVENPORT  
 MOD//ACDS(OPS/CY)  
 MOD//DCDS(C)  
 MOD//DIO  
 MOD//MISS SCHOLEFIELD  
 .(FP (BOSNIA) RM 5163)  
 MOD//MS SAMUEL  
 .(PRESS/SEC RM 6328)  
 MOD//HD/SP(BOSNIA)RM 5163  
 PS/PM

NO 10//MR REES  
 DTI//MR MANTLE  
 DTI//MR LEVINSON  
 DTI//MR ARATHOON  
 DTI//MR MEADWAY  
 HMT//MISS CATCHPOLE  
 HMT//MR RUTTER  
 HMT//MR COHEN  
 HMT//MISS YOUNG  
 HMT//MRS SAMUEL  
 HMT//MS YOUNG  
 HMT//PS/CHANCELLOR  
 BANKE//MR GAMMON  
 BANKE//S&S DIV  
 HO//MR ELLINOR  
 ECGD//MR HAWTIN  
 D/TSPT//MS WHATMORE  
 D/TSPT//MR GOLDMAN  
 ATT GEN//WHOMERSLEY  
 HMCE//MR RUSSELL  
 HMCE//MISS MAWER  
 HMCE//MR TREVETT

NNNN

PAGE 2  
CONFIDENTIAL



File

**10 DOWNING STREET**

Prime Minister Possible,  
I doubt it  
Bosnian hostages - war or being

You told the House you <sup>at a</sup> deal.  
were not aware of any deal,  
and we had not  
entered into a deal. That  
was too accurate.

What this tells us,  
speculatively rather than  
definitively, is that the  
French may have done some  
sort of a deal. But we don't  
know for sure, and they are  
denying it.

I doubt if Clinton would  
have agreed to no more  
air strikes.  
Rosen.



SECRET



373

Foreign &  
Commonwealth  
Office

30 Jun 1995

London SW1A 2AH

Dear Rodenz,

Bosnia: Deals Over Hostages

The Prime Minister was asked in the House on Wednesday whether he could confirm that no deal had been done by any government, or the UN, to secure the release of the hostages in Bosnia. He replied as in the attached Hansard extract. You asked us to set down what information we have about the persistent rumours of deals.

The position is that both the UN and the French government have publicly denied any deal over hostages. In particular, Boutros Ghali has written to Claes to assure him that the release of UNPROFOR personnel was unconditional.

Carl Bildt, however, gave the Secretary of State a somewhat different account of events in their meeting on 26 June in the Cannes margins. As we already knew, General de Lapresle, now Bildt's Military Adviser, but at that stage acting on French instructions, visited Pale around 17-18 June for contacts with the Bosnian Serbs. Bildt claims that there were parallel telephone contacts between Chirac and Milosevic. Bildt said that he did not know the detail of these exchanges; but he believed that Chirac had given "some form of undertaking" that there would be no further air strikes if the hostages were released; and that Chirac had also talked to President Clinton and agreed with him that further air strikes would require the agreement of "the major powers".

Bildt's  
"belief": not  
authoritative.

Not the same thing.

SECRET

SECRET



[Redacted]

[Redacted]

We are unlikely ever to know the full truth about all of this. As the Secretary of State told Bildt, it is plausible that Chirac told Milosevic that air strikes in the immediate aftermath of hostage release were unlikely, but stopped short of any formal undertaking. As for a deal on the release of Serb prisoners and withdrawal from points around Sarajevo, this was all likely to happen anyway, so may not have represented a real concession.

As for the Prime Minister's public line, we have to take public assurances from the French government and the UN at face value. If they say that there was no deal, and we have no incontrovertible evidence to the contrary, we cannot publicly cast doubt on this. So the Prime Minister could not have taken any other line in the House yesterday. But he may wish to phrase future responses to this question in careful terms, along the lines that: "the UK certainly made no deals; and the UN and other governments have stated clearly that they made no deals either".

*and would not have been party to any deal*

*Yours ever,*

*Sar*

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS  
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)  
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

(S J Sharpe)  
Private Secretary

Roderic Lyne Esq CMG  
10 Downing Street

SECRET

[Mr. Tim Renton]

noticed that in his absence there have been some scary remarks about the abolition of the pound—a sound bite if ever there was?

Given the brilliant option that my right hon. Friend secured for sterling at Maastricht, can he tell the House whether any European leader at Cannes suggested to him the early abolition of the pound or any ill consequences for Britain if we decided not to join a single currency?

**The Prime Minister:** No. I can confirm that no pressure in respect of either of those points was directed at me by my European partners at the Cannes summit or at any previous summit. People are now examining with great care the detailed implications of proceeding. I welcome that debate because, even for people who have looked at the matter carefully, many of the operational matters that will necessarily follow are not yet clear and require careful examination.

**Mr. Malcolm Wicks** (Croydon, North-West): Given the Prime Minister's assurance that no deal was done with the Karadzic Serbs about UN hostages, how does he square that with United Nations sources in Bosnia that confirmed that a deal was done? Is it purely a coincidence that, despite the slaughter of Bosnian citizens, including children, there have been no further air strikes, even though NATO asked for them? Will he absolutely confirm to the House that no deal was done by any Government, the United Nations or any United Nations official that there would be no air strikes if the hostages were released?

**The Prime Minister:** Yes, I can give the hon. Gentleman an assurance on both points. No deal was done of which I, my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary or any other heads of Government to whom I have spoken are aware, to secure the release of the hostages. Nor has any undertaking been given by member Governments or commanders on the ground about future air strikes.

**Mr. Wicks:** Not by the UN?

**The Prime Minister:** No. No deal was given. As I indicated earlier and on previous occasions, we have not entered into those deals. I do not know what has been said or what the hon. Gentleman heard, but his comments do not remotely accord with the information that I have.

**Sir Patrick Cormack** (Staffordshire, South): Does my right hon. Friend accept that almost everyone who wants Britain to continue to play a constructive part in the European union of nation states will want our country to be led by a skilful, tough and experienced negotiator? Is he aware that most people believe that we have such a person at the moment?

**The Prime Minister:** I am extremely grateful to my hon. Friend, who has put his point most generously. I look forward to carrying out that task.

**Mr. Geoffrey Hoon** (Ashfield): Does the Prime Minister agree with the Foreign Secretary that the right hon. Member for Wokingham (Mr. Redwood) has damaged the effectiveness of Britain?

**The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs** (Mr. Douglas Hurd): I did not say anything of the kind.

**The Prime Minister:** The hon. Gentleman may have heard the sotto voce interruption, almost for the first time in his many years in the House, by my right hon. Friend. If I heard him right, he said no such thing. "What rubbish," he said. At least, I think that is what he said.

**Mr. Ray Whitney** (Wycombe): Does my right hon. Friend agree that the progress made at the summit on job creation, more subsidiarity and better clarification of all the issues involved in the introduction of a single currency demonstrates once again the crucial importance to Britain of continuing to be involved in a positive and constructive way with our 14 partners in the European Union?

**The Prime Minister:** Yes, I do agree. It is often quoted at me that I have said that the United Kingdom should be at the heart of Europe, and I believe that we should. Unless we are at the heart of Europe advocating what we believe is right for Europe, we will not have influence in Europe. That does not mean that we must accept everything that our European partners say, do or think, and every direction in which they wish to go. By being at the heart of Europe, we can influence the direction of the European Union, and I intend that we should do that.

**Mr. Clive Soley** (Hammersmith): The Prime Minister said that some problems relating to a single currency will be referred to the Finance Council for further consideration. Will not Finance Ministers have to consider that matter in the context of the Maastricht treaty, which calls for a single currency—albeit with a British opt-out? Is it not a fact that the British Government's "Shall we, shan't we?" policy has not helped the Prime Minister or his party, and cannot possibly help Britain?

**The Prime Minister:** When my right hon. Friend and his partners in ECOFIN look at it, it will not be within the confines of the treaty but against its backcloth. But the treaty says nothing at all about the problems that are about to be examined. I shall not list them all again, because I set out some of them in answering questions and in my statement. Those matters require to be examined in detail.

The Maastricht treaty set out the objectives, subject, of course, to the convergence criteria and other matters, but it is essential that these issues are examined. When they are, the reality of what occurs from that examination will have to be taken into account by all the Heads of Government. The aspiration, the wish, for a single currency, has always been based upon the right economic criteria. That was the reason for the convergence criteria. My right hon. Friend and his colleagues will be examining many matters that will be absolutely material to that.

**Mr. John Wilkinson** (Ruislip-Northwood): At the Cannes summit, the European Heads of Government agreed to the disbursement of no less than 24.7 billion ecu to the countries of eastern Europe, the Mediterranean, the Caribbean, Africa and the Pacific. For the Mediterranean, the amount was 10 per cent. less than previously anticipated. None the less, there is more in real terms. Does my right hon. Friend think that such vast expenditure on countries that are fairly far from home are in the best interests of the British people? Are they in accordance with our party's principles of trying to reduce public expenditure in real terms?

**The Prime Minister:** Aid has always been part of our public expenditure pattern. As I showed in my statement,



RECEIVED  
1954  
1954

**CONFIDENTIAL**

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 0171-21 82111/2/3

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 6/18/5J

30 June 1995

*✓ FO 1030/6*

*7/2 d/c M*

*Rmjl 30/2*

*Dear Rod,*

**BOSNIA: 24 AIRMOBILE BRIGADE**

Thank you for your letter of 26th June in which you said that the Prime Minister agreed to the Defence Secretary's proposals for the deployment of 24 Airmobile Brigade, subject to certain modifications.

Margaret Aldred subsequently spoke to Edward Oakden to explain that the Defence Secretary proposed to take up the provisional US offer of sea and air lift for the brigade but that, given the need for President Clinton to consult Congress about this, it could involve up to seven days delay in the deployment. Edward confirmed that this would be acceptable.

You will know that, Congressional difficulties notwithstanding, President Clinton has now authorised provision of the sea and air transport, and we expect additional materiel support from the US for the Rapid Reaction Force. The Defence Secretary very much welcomes this and regards the benefits, political as well as financial, as well worth the short delay in the deployment of the brigade.

Unfortunately, as the Defence Secretary foreshadowed in his minute of 19th June, we have continued to face difficulties with the Croatian Government, as well as with the Muslim-Croat Federation, over the deployment of the additional forces for the RRF. These problems appear to have been caused largely by the French in precipitately despatching their extra troops without the normal clearances through the UN. The FCO are trying to sort this out urgently both in New York and in theatre.

R M J Lyne Esq CMG  
10 Downing Street

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Recycled Paper

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Subject to that, the advance party of 24 Brigade (some 450 personnel) is scheduled to deploy, in US aircraft, between 2nd and 6th July. A Press facility for this will be provided at RAF Brize Norton for the initial departure on Sunday. The activation party, comprising logistics and engineer troops, whose equipment is due to leave the UK by sea on 9/10th July, will arrive in Split on 16/17th July. The main body of the Brigade, is scheduled to deploy, by sea and air, from 27th July, with offloading in Croatia complete by 7th August. The rest of the brigade will remain at short notice in the UK, capable of deployment to theatre within seven days.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD, and to Melanie Leech and Paul Lever.

*Yours ever,*

*Mike*

(M A VENABLES)  
Private Secretary

**CONFIDENTIAL**



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 0171-21 82111/2/3

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 6/18/5G

29 June 1995

Dear William,

Spoke to Treasury  
1 MOD, 30/6

EC t:

+ file

29/6

DEPLOYMENT OF 24 AIR MOBILE BRIGADE

In his letter (6/18/5) of 19th June, the Defence Secretary set out the possible costs of the deployment of 24 Air Mobile Brigade to Bosnia to be met in the normal way under the Armstrong formula. In his minute of 22nd June to the Prime Minister, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he could only accept the costs of the deployment as a charge for the FCO if the Treasury confirmed it would accept the costs as a claim on the reserve in accordance with long standing practice.

The planned timescale for deployment is extremely tight and, if we are to meet the Prime Minister's wishes, we here must start entering into financial commitments immediately. Normally this would be pretty straight-forward with the FCO approving early or novel commitments, while the overall funding arrangements were sorted out in slightly slower time. In this instance, however, the lack of Treasury agreement to your claim against the reserve, coupled with the difficulties over UN funding, have prevented your officials providing this approval. If we do not get the go ahead today, there will be a serious risk that we will have to slow the deployment down.

Could I ask you to resolve this problem with the Treasury as a matter of urgency, so that this deployment which has been agreed collectively by Ministers, is not delayed?

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and to Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

Your ever

*P M Aldred*

(P M ALDRED)  
Private Secretary

William Ehrman Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC  
ON BEHALF OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL

Our policy towards the former Yugoslavia must be both clear and firm.

- I. The UN forces have accordingly regrouped in more secure positions and a Rapid Reaction Force has been set up. This policy has secured the unconditional release of all the hostages. UNPROFOR is now in a position to carry out its mission effectively.
- II. Firm action must be accompanied by renewed diplomatic efforts and the European Union has therefore appointed Mr Carl Bildt as a new mediator.

Having heard a report on his initial talks in former Yugoslavia, the European Council has asked Mr Bildt to return there immediately with the following five tasks:

1. to secure the lifting of the siege of Sarajevo and the establishment of a land access corridor and access to the enclaves;
2. to resume talks with all the Bosnian parties on the basis of the current peace plan;
3. to re-establish the dialogue between the Government of Zagreb and the Serb leaders in Krajina;
4. to resume negotiations on the mutual recognition of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina as a first step towards a general recognition of all the States which have emerged from the former Yugoslavia;
5. to secure a moratorium on all military operations in Bosnia.



III. Mr Carl Bildt has been asked to report on his efforts to the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Fifteen at their Council meeting on 17 July.

The European Council invites the United States and Russia to endorse this peace initiative unreservedly and to support the action of the European mediator.

---

EX-YOUGOSLAVIE

DECLARATION DU PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE  
AU NOM DU CONSEIL EUROPEEN

Nous voulons, dans l'ex-Yougoslavie, une politique qui soit à la fois claire et ferme.

- I. Cette volonté s'est traduite par le regroupement des casques bleus sur des positions plus solides et par la mise en place de la Force de Réaction Rapide. Cette politique a permis la libération sans aucune contrepartie de tous les otages. La FORPRONU est désormais en mesure d'accomplir effectivement ses missions.
- II. Cette fermeté doit s'accompagner d'une relance des efforts diplomatiques. Telle est la signification de la désignation par l'Union européenne de M. Carl BILDT comme nouveau médiateur.

Après avoir entendu le compte rendu de ses premiers contacts en ex-Yougoslavie, le Conseil européen a demandé à M. BILDT de retourner immédiatement sur place, avec les cinq missions suivantes :

1. Obtenir la levée du siège de Sarajevo, avec notamment l'établissement d'un corridor d'accès terrestre ainsi que l'accès aux enclaves ;
2. Renouer le dialogue avec toutes les parties bosniaques, sur la base du plan de paix actuel ;
3. Rétablir le dialogue entre le gouvernement de Zagreb et les responsables serbes des Krajinas ;
4. Reprendre la négociation sur la reconnaissance mutuelle de la République Fédérale de Yougoslavie et de la Bosnie-Herzégovine, comme première étape vers une reconnaissance générale de tous les Etats issus de l'ancienne Yougoslavie ;
5. Obtenir un moratoire sur toutes les opérations militaires en Bosnie.

III. Il est demandé à M. Carl BILDT de rendre compte de ses efforts aux Ministres des Affaires étrangères des Quinze à l'occasion de leur Conseil du 17 juillet.

Le Conseil européen invite les Etats-Unis et la Russie à soutenir sans réserve cette initiative de paix et à appuyer l'action du médiateur européen.



*File*  
*EO*  
*CM*

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 0171-21 82111/2/3

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 6/18/5G

*John I looks to me  
like phased deployment.*

*28<sup>th</sup>* June 1995

*Thyl.*  
*28*

*Dear Roderic*

**BOSNIA AND THE GULF: PARLIAMENTARY BULLETIN**


I attach the next of our regular bulletins on the activities of British forces in Bosnia and the Gulf. This will be placed in the Library of each House tomorrow at 15.30.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD and to the Minister of Overseas Development, to Dugald Sandeman (Lord President's Office) to Murdo Maclean (Chief Whip's Office) and to Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

*Yours Sincerely*  
*Sadie McGowan*

*PP* (MOLLIE FIELD)  
Private Secretary

R M J Lyne Esq CMG  
10 Downing Street



Recycled Paper

EVENTS IN YUGOSLAVIA AND IRAQ - ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

28 June 1995

The Former Yugoslavia

- The Secretary of State announced on 26 June that the phased deployment of 24 Airmobile Brigade would begin, with an advance party of of some 350 personnel arriving in theatre next week. A further 1,000 logistics and engineer personnel will follow to prepare the infrastructure to support the main body of over 3,000 troops. The Brigade will form an important part of the UN's Rapid Reaction Force.
- Sadly, Private Darren Hole died after sustaining a gunshot wound from his own weapon at the British base in Vitez on 23 June.
- On 22 June, the BSA directly targeted OP14 in Gorazde, destroying a Landrover. There were no casualties.
- BRITFOR continues to help monitor the activities of the warring factions along the confrontation lines in Bosnia. Efforts continue to renew the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement which lapsed on 1 May. 6 Army Lynx helicopters are now operating in Bosnia as part of our additional contribution to UNPROFOR. The remaining helicopters and additional UNMOs which make up the balance of the original UK offer are on stand-by.
- In Sarajevo, a 70-strong British Army mortar locating troop equipped with Cymbeline mortar locating radar continues to monitor the activities of the warring factions around the city.
- The UNHCR humanitarian airlift into Sarajevo is still suspended. The total amount of aid delivered by the RAF Hercules remains at 23,943 tonnes.

- 4 RN Sea Kings remain at Divule Barracks, Split, with 2 permanently on stand-by for casualty evacuation.
- The Royal Navy Task Group comprising HMS ILLUSTRIOUS, HMS BOXER and RFAs FORT AUSTIN and OLN A are on operations in the Adriatic.
- RFA RESOURCE remains in Split harbour providing accommodation and stores support to BRITFOR.
- HMS GLASGOW and HMS BATTLEAXE continue, as part of NATO's Standing Naval Forces Atlantic and Mediterranean respectively, to conduct stop and search operations in the Adriatic in support of the UN arms embargo and trade sanctions. The next detachment of two RAF Nimrod MPA aircraft deployed to Sigonella in Sicily, to support this operation, on 21 June. The detachment is due to end on 6 July.
- 8 RAF Jaguars are now on stand-by at Gioia del Colle, Italy, as part of the NATO capability for air operations over Bosnia. Authority was given on 21 June for 3 Jaguars to return to stand by in the UK. Following the loss of a Jaguar in the Adriatic on 21 June, an additional Jaguar was placed on stand by in the UK.
- RAF Sentry E3D, Tornado F3 aircraft, and Sea Harriers embarked on HMS ILLUSTRIOUS, together with Tristar air-to-air refuelling support, continue to play their part in NATO NFZ operations.

#### The Gulf

- Reconnaissance sorties by RAF Tornados in northern and southern Iraq, as part of coalition action in support of UN Security Council Resolution 688, continue on a routine basis.

Key

BSA	Bosnian Serb Army
UNHCR	UN High Commission for Refugees
MG	Machine gun
BRITFOR	British Forces
UNPROFOR	UN Protection Force
UNMO	UN Military Observer
OP	Observation Post
RFA	Royal Fleet Auxiliary
MPA	Maritime Patrol Aircraft
NFZ	No Fly Zone

270 8843



9



CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

26 June 1995

*Dear Margaret,*

**BOSNIA**

The Prime Minister has seen the Defence Secretary's minute of 19 June about the deployment of 24 Air Mobile Brigade. He has also seen the Foreign Secretary's minute of 22 June.

The Prime Minister has taken note of the practical arguments in favour of a phased deployment of the force. He understands that the Chiefs of Staff advise that the initial deployment envisaged in paragraph 11 of the Defence Secretary's minute would, when taken together with the full deployment in July of the Multi-National Brigade, constitute a robust capability which is judged adequate for the currently foreseeable circumstances.

Nevertheless, he considers it essential that this initial element of the Brigade's fighting capacity should be in theatre as quickly as possible, and that any remaining components in the United Kingdom should be capable of being moved into theatre very rapidly should the Force Commanders require them. He also considers that it would be premature to announce, or imply, now that one of the Aviation Regiments and one of the Infantry Battalions will be held in reserve: rather, we should take a decision on whether to proceed with the deployment of the full force in August or September in the light of the situation on the ground and the likely length of time for which this type of capability might be needed.

The Prime Minister therefore agrees with the Defence Secretary's proposals subject to the following modifications, which I understand have been discussed with your Department:

- There should be a firm planning target of end July for the deployment of the main contingent of the Brigade, of some 4,000 troops.

CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

- 2 -

- We must plan that any troops held in the United Kingdom thereafter should be capable of being deployed in theatre within seven days.
- Our public line should be that we expect the main contingent of 24 Air Mobile Brigade to be deployed by the end of July, and preparations are continuing to enable the deployment of the remainder as required.

The Prime Minister's view is without prejudice to the question of the attribution of costs, on which the Treasury's comments are awaited.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to OPD members, to Melanie Leech and to Paul Lever.

*Yours man  
Roderic.*

**RODERIC LYNE**

Miss P M Aldred CBE  
Ministry of Defence

**CONFIDENTIAL**

*tw*

✓ CM

Edward

Faxed to Party 28/6

(2)

T02841

MR LYNE

cc Mr Lever  
Mr Sawers (PS/Foreign Secretary)

ku

to 28/6.

**CANNES COUNCIL: LINE FOR THE PRESS ON THE APPOINTMENT OF CARL BILDT AND ON FORMER YUGOSLAVIA**

I have just been telephoned by Francois Delattre in President Chirac's Office, who informed me that the President and Carl Bildt met last night to discuss the line which President Chirac could take with the Press, on behalf of the European Council, on the above subjects. He stressed that this was an outline sketch and that he wished to give "our senior partner" as much advanced notice as possible of what was proposed.

2. I attach the notes which I took over the phone (in French, my own translation, which may not be perfect in every respect).

J. J. Gould


D J GOULD

Cabinet Office  
26 June 1995

Att

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA DRAFT PRESS LINE TO TAKE  
PROPOSED BY PRESIDENT CHIRAC AND MR CARL BILDT

- our wish is for a firm and clear policy on the former Yugoslavia;
- this wish is manifested by the regrouping of United Nations Forces into more solid positions, and the setting up of the Rapid Reaction Force; this has enabled all the UN hostages to be released without any form of concession; UNPROFOR is now in a position effectively to carry out its mission;
- these measures are to be accompanied by a relaunch of the diplomatic process; that is the significance of the appointment of Mr Carl Bildt as the new European Union negotiator. After hearing an account of Mr Bildt's first contacts with the parties he has been invited to relaunch the diplomatic process on five points;
- to obtain the lifting of the seige of Sarajevo and in particular to establish a corridor for land access; *by force?*
- to restart dialogue among all the parties in Bosnia on the basis of the current peace plan (Delattre confirmed this meant the Contact Group Plan); ✓
- to re-establish dialogue between the Government in Zagreb and the leaders of the Krajina Serbs; ✓
- to take up again negotiations on mutual recognition between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a first stage towards general recognition among all the states issuing from the former Yugoslavia; ✓

- to obtain a moratorium of four months on all military operations in Bosnia; 
  
- Mr Carl Bildt has been asked to report back to the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the 15 nations at the time of the General Affairs Council meeting on 17 July. The Council of the European Union invites the United States and Russia to give their full support to this peace initiative and to the efforts of the European Union negotiator.

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign &  
Commonwealth  
Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 June 1995

*JVE*

*Dear Roderic,*

European Council : Bosnia

Thank you for your letter of 22 June reporting the French intention to issue a declaration on Bosnia after the working dinner in Cannes on Monday 26 June.

We too want a declaration with a strong message. But the elements which Levitte described to you are not quite right. They focus exclusively on Sarajevo. The demand for respect of the heavy weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo is overtaken by the redeployment of troops away from the weapons control points (and is therefore somewhat odd). An "ambitious" mandate for Bildt is all right if kept in general terms only. We do not want to provoke a debate which might reduce Bildt's room for manoeuvre. Any detail will risk a counter-productive row with the Germans over the relative importance of Croatia and Bosnia, the propriety of contacts with Pale etc. Our aim should therefore be to secure clear language on the main points.

At today's UK/French co-ordination meeting (by video conference), Pauline Neville-Jones proposed that the declaration might focus on the following:

- 1) the overriding importance of a political settlement and full EU support for Bildt's efforts;
- 2) the parties' obligation to allow freedom of movement so that UNPROFOR and UNHCR can carry out their tasks, in particular in Sarajevo and the enclaves;
- 3) importance of renewing the ceasefire;
- 4) the shortage of time available to achieve progress.

Referring to the UK intention to raise at Cannes the question of funding for the Rapid Reaction Force, the French asked whether we would want language specifically on this point in the declaration. Pauline Neville-Jones said that we were seeking EU solidarity behind the RRF, which naturally included financing. (We intend to propose to the French language for the declaration on the lines of the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



... enclosed draft.) Pauline Neville-Jones said that the UK would want to give strong support to the Presidency and would welcome early sight of a French draft.

There may be an opportunity for some discussion with the French in the margin of the Contact Group meeting in Paris in the afternoon of Sunday 25 June. We shall brief you on this meeting on Sunday evening.

I am copying this letter to Margaret Aldred (Ministry of Defence), Paul Lever and Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office) and by fax to Sir Christopher Mallaby (Paris).

*Yours ever,*

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'John'.

(R J Sawers)  
Principal Private Secretary

Roderic Lyne Esq CMG  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

**DRAFT LANGUAGE ON FINANCING/RAPID REACTION FORCE FOR CANNES**

Heads of Government welcomed the contribution to the Rapid Reaction Force being made by European governments and pledged their solidarity in ensuring that the UN had the necessary financial resources for deployment.



BRIT EMB WASHINGTON 1

FRI 23 JUN 95 22:14

FIG.02

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

British Embassy  
WashingtonLEEO  
CM

23 June 1995

3100 Massachusetts Avenue N.W.  
Washington D.C. 20008-3600Telephone: (202) 898-4292  
Facsimile: (202) 898-4253By FaxJohn Sawers Esq  
PS  
FCO  
W52

From The Ambassador

Dear John,

## BOSNIA: UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL

1. We have convinced the Americans that we are not planning for UNPROFOR withdrawal, that we intend to grit our teeth and stay in Bosnia if we possibly can: and the more the Administration think through the consequences of withdrawal, the more they hope we will be able to hold on.
2. I am concerned, however, about the state of our own thinking about what would happen if UNPROFOR did have to withdraw. Dole and Gingrich have said that they would support the involvement of U.S. ground forces, subject to agreement that the arms embargo should be lifted after withdrawal and, above all, clear cut NATO command. Lanxade, however, appears to be thinking of possible withdrawal (at least of French forces) without U.S. ground force involvement (Paris telno 808).
3. As substantial U.S. and other forces are deployed under the NATO plan, there will be an obvious risk of clashes with the Bosnian Serbs. In that event CAS would be called in and that would require the prior suppression of the Bosnian Serb air defences which are integrated with those of Serbia. There could also be clashes with Bosnian government forces.
4. As we proceeded to withdraw from the enclaves, fighting would to be bound to break out between the Muslim defenders and the Serbs surrounding them. If this happens with large numbers of civilian refugees trapped in the enclaves, the

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

23 JUN '95 22:15

23

PAGE.002

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL



U.S. are likely to demand that the Bosnian Serbs should be warned not to overrun the enclaves and that, if they fail to heed those warnings, there should be air strikes against them.

5. The same issue will arise in an even more acute form as we attempt to leave Sarajevo. The U.S. are likely to want a warning to be given to the Serbs not to overrun or cut off all supplies to the city and will want that to be backed by the threat of air strikes. They will argue that the authority for this already exists in SCR 770 providing for use of "all measures necessary to facilitate delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and wherever needed in other parts of Bosnia".

6. I think we all accept that if UNPROFOR had to withdraw, it would make no sense to continue with the arms embargo, which does penalise the Bosnian Muslims more than the Serbs. But I have the impression that we still are hoping that withdrawal might take place without the necessity for air strikes against the Serbs. I am afraid that I think that a very questionable proposition.

7. The differences over Bosnia already have inflicted serious damage over NATO. We all are agreed, I think, that the single most important objective if withdrawal does take place will be to try to limit damage to the Alliance. I am not sure that, on present thinking, we would be able to avoid that. If the U.S. wish to threaten air strikes to deter the Serbs from overrunning Sarajevo and we helped to block that, we would be held responsible here - however unreasonably - if Sarajevo then were attacked or completely cut off.

8. Given these very unpleasant possibilities, clearly we should do everything we can to avoid withdrawal, though I continue to hope that we will find ways to draw down our force in Bosnia over time. We certainly need to get them out of Gorazde.

9. My second conclusion, however, is that if we proceed on the assumption that the Bosnian Serbs should not be warned and that no action should be taken against them, we shall be heading for a much bigger transatlantic bust up than has hitherto been the case. In particular I must warn that many of those who have been pretty sympathetic to our position on Bosnia, including the leading members of the Bush Administration, would not be sympathetic to a policy of allowing the Serbs without hindrance to storm or cut off all supplies to Sarajevo. They would accept that air strikes might not be effective, but they would not accept that the Serbs should suffer no penalties if they proceeded to use UNPROFOR withdrawal to try to finish off the Bosnian

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

23 JUN '95 23:10 FROM MINI COMCEN

PAGE.004

BRIT EMB WASHINGTON 1

FRI 23 JUN 95 22:16

PG.04

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL



government or helpless civilians - as they are all too likely to try to do.

*Yours ever,*

*Robin*

Robin Renwick

cc: Field Marshal Sir Peter Inge,  
CDS, MOD

Mr John Goulden CMG  
UKDEL NATO

Mr Roderic Lyne CMG  
No 10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

useful work by Paul Lever.  
He has secured an improved timetable and come up with a possible movement plan, agreed with MoD.

He suggests reserving your final decision on whether the last bits of 24 Air Mobile stay here or go until August/Sept.

Content for me to despatch the draft letter to MoD?

Rodney.  
24.6

CONFIDENTIAL

~~c-em.~~

Ref: B0.1818

MR LYNE  
\_\_\_\_\_

c Miss Leech

**Bosnia: Deployment of 24 Air Mobile Brigade**

I undertook to let you have advice on the Defence Secretary's minute of 19 June in which he indicated his intention of proceeding with a phased deployment of 24 Air Mobile Brigade, involving the establishment of an initial capability at a time which might be in 6 weeks from now; and the holding back at 72 hours' notice in the United Kingdom of one of the Brigade's two Aviation Regiments and one of its two Infantry Battalions.

2. I held a discussion yesterday with representatives of the MOD, the FCO and the Treasury to go over the reasons underlying the Defence Secretary's proposals and to clarify certain elements of them. We noted the following:

- (a) The requirement on the ground. The release of the hostages and the regrouping of the most exposed UNPROFOR personnel have improved the situation and reduced the level of risk to UNPROFOR to some extent. The military advice is that the deployment of some 4,000 members of 24 Air Mobile Brigade and their substantial armoury, together with the Multi-National Brigade, which should be fully deployed by mid-July, constitutes a sufficiently robust capability to protect UNPROFOR in the likely foreseeable circumstances; and that the remaining assets of 24 Air Mobile Brigade would be required only in a very much more serious

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

situation. Nonetheless, having so recently decided that British forces in Bosnia were under sufficient threat as to warrant the despatch of the full Brigade, and having received wide support for this decision in Parliament, the Government would unwise to appear to be concluding too prematurely that the risk was greatly reduced.

- (b) Logistics. The movement and reception of such a large contingent in theatre represents a major exercise, and the MOD are anxious neither to over burden the Force Commanders nor to risk British troops finding themselves without adequate accommodation and bases. Full deployment would therefore be bound to take some time.
- (c) Roulement. 24 Air Mobile Brigade is unique, and the British Army could not replace it like for like at the end of its tour. Although the deployment has been envisaged as a one shot operation, the holding back of an Aviation Regiment and an Infantry Battalion offers the potential for roulement if events over the summer and autumn suggest that a period longer than six months is necessary since these are the elements of the Brigade which are most difficult to replace. (This argument does not, of course, appeal to the Treasury who wish to tie down the period of deployment as tightly as possible.)

## CONFIDENTIAL

(d) Timings. The somewhat leisurely looking timings in paragraph 11 of the Defence Secretary's minute could be tightened as follows:

- the planning target for the deployment of 4,000 members of 24 Air Mobile Brigade, including the first Aviation Regiment and an Infantry Battalion, would be end July; (Any date depends of course upon the cooperation of the Croatian authorities.)
- the remainder of the Brigade (the other Aviation Regiment and Infantry Battalion) could in an emergency be in theatre within 7 days of a request by the Force Commanders.

3. In the light of these considerations, I think that there is a sound military case for phased deployment of the Brigade. But the public expectation is that all the additional British forces which have been announced will be deployed as quickly as possible. To announce now that there will not in fact be full deployment of 24 Air Mobile Brigade would detract from the tough stance which the Government has taken and for which it has received much credit. It would be best therefore to take the line that 24 Air Mobile Brigade is being deployed on a phased basis in the light of logistical factors. By the end of July some 4,000 troops will have been despatched (together with the 1,000 or so who are our contribution to the Multi-National Brigade). That will allow us to decide in August or September whether or not the deployment of the remaining forces is justified. A decision not to deploy would be more readily explicable than it is now, if the situation on the ground was by then clearer.

CONFIDENTIAL

4. I understand that the Foreign Secretary and the Chancellor of the Exchequer are likely to be briefed in this sense by their officials. I attach a draft response to the Defence Secretary's minute, if the Prime Minister agrees.

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Paul Lever". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial 'P'.

PAUL LEVER

22 June 1995

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL



PPS P1

~~cc EO~~~~CM~~PM/95/047PRIME MINISTERDeployment of 24 Air Mobile Brigade

1. I have seen Malcolm Rifkind's minute of 19 June setting out his recommendations for the deployment of 24 Air Mobile Brigade.
2. I welcome the fact that the initial deployments of 24 Air Mobile Brigade will now go ahead. I understand that MOD officials estimate that, assuming the cooperation of the receiving governments, it will be possible for the first phase of deployment of 24 Air Mobile Brigade to theatre to be completed by the end of July. I think it important that these troops should be in place before the summer break.
3. I note the practical difficulties in the deployment of the full 24 Air Mobile Brigade simultaneously. I also understand that in view of the additional strength in theatre provided by the multinational brigade which has come into being since OPD took the decision to deploy 24 Air Mobile Brigade, the MOD now feels that it is not necessary to deploy all the additional teeth capability which a full deployment of the brigade would bring and that half will do. I would not wish to second guess this military judgement. It is however obviously important that the forces deployed are capable of doing the things which we have publicly said they will do, and that we do not lay ourselves open to the charge that the capability actually deployed was insufficient. I believe that the numbers in

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



theatre are less important than a clear understanding of how they will be used to improve the present parlous situation in many parts of Bosnia - which we do not yet have.

4. From this I draw two conclusions. First, I hope that a decision to phase is not, at least at this stage, a decision in practice not to deploy the remaining battalion. They may be needed and I imagine that the further phase of deployment will be kept under constant review in conjunction with the force commanders. If we do not have to take an earlier decision on further deployment, I suggest that in any case we should review the need for it in early September. Secondly, there might be an emergency at any time. I am reassured to hear from officials that in such circumstances the force could be flown out to reach theatre in a matter of days. We need to prepare for this in case of need.

5. As I understand it, the full deployment of the Air Mobile Brigade would have ruled out the possibility of roulement. I am told that an argument in favour of deploying only half the teeth capability of 24 Air Mobile Brigade initially would be that a roulement would then become possible. I see that this could have some advantages. I do not however think that we should begin to plan on this basis, nor let the world think that we are.

6. Finally, there are the presentational aspects. We have made much internationally of our decision to deploy 24 Air Mobile Brigade and have received strong backing from other troop contributors and a good hearing at the UN. We do not want to have to explain that we have now taken a different - and lesser - decision. We must not therefore be seen to back-track and for the foreseeable future should maintain that

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



all that is at issue is phasing for practical reasons. If and when we decide that the conditions on the ground justify not deploying the additional teeth, it should be easier to explain then why the original decision is being modified. I hope that officials can urgently work out a tenable public presentation along these lines.

7. On this basis, I can accept Malcolm Rifkind's proposal for phased deployment.

8. On the financial aspects, my Private Secretary has minuted separately on the steps we are taking to protect the UK's position in the wake of the US decision to oppose funding the reinforcements through UN assessed contributions. As for responsibility in Whitehall, I can only accept the costs of deploying the additional troops (both 19 Field Regiment and 24 Air Mobile) as a charge to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office if the Treasury confirm that they will accept the costs as a claim on the Reserve in accordance with long accepted practice. I have no provision for the cost within my existing budget and cannot therefore accept a charge on any other basis.

9. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the President of the Board of Trade, the Secretary of State for Defence, the Attorney-General, the Lord Privy Seal and to Sir Robin Butler.

*DH.*  
(DOUGLAS HURD)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
22 June 1995

CONFIDENTIAL

*lie* *sh*

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

22 June 1995

*Dear Sam,***EUROPEAN COUNCIL, BOSNIA**

As I have reported to you, Levitte told me today that the French wanted to issue a "strong declaration on Bosnia" after the working dinner in Cannes on the evening of Monday 26 June.

Carl Bildt would be reporting on his first foray into the region at the Foreign Ministers' dinner. The French then proposed to invite Bildt and Charette to join Heads of Government for coffee (possibly accompanied by the other Foreign Ministers; alternatively Charette would act as rapporteur). They would present the statement to the Heads of Government.

I said it would be helpful to have an early sight of the French draft. Levitte said the French did not propose to finalise it until they had some account of Bildt's progress in Sarajevo and Pale. He hoped to be able to telephone me on Sunday evening to discuss the statement. The elements which the French had in mind included:

- an appeal for the opening of a corridor to Sarajevo;
- an appeal for the reopening of Sarajevo airport;
- demand that the heavy weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo should be respected;
- an "ambitious" mandate for Bildt's further negotiations.

I assume that you will hear further details of this from the French Foreign Ministry, either at the conclave or in separate contacts.

CONFIDENTIAL

*sh*

**CONFIDENTIAL**

- 2 -

I would be grateful for your advice on any points to make to Levitte if he calls over the weekend.

I am copying this letter to Margaret Aldred (Ministry of Defence), Paul Lever and Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office) and by fax to Sir Christopher Mallaby (Paris).

*yours ever,*

*Roderic*

**RODERIC LYNE**

Sam Sharpe, Esq.  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

**CONFIDENTIAL**

RESTRICTED



Foreign &  
Commonwealth  
Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 June 1995

*FO**Gritted teeth!**Doesn't see pm**Jean Rodez,**anything he doesn't  
know (that matters).**file pm.*

UNPROFOR Reinforcements: Funding

*24/6*

Security Council Resolution 998, adopted on 16 June, authorised an increase of 12,500 in the personnel ceiling for UNPROFOR, but provided that the modalities of financing the reinforcement would be decided later.

Background to the Security Council Decision

The United Nations Secretary-General had recommended that the proposed reinforcements should be funded by UN assessed contributions in line with existing arrangements for funding UNPROFOR. This approach was supported by those countries, including the French and ourselves, which had offered additional troops.

The Americans however made clear that they would not be able to support the resolution unless it provided that the question of funding would be decided later. French hopes that President Chirac had managed to win over the key figures in Congress were disappointed. Newt Gingrich and Bob Dole told President Clinton on 15 June that congressional support for the proposed resolution was conditional on the costs being borne through voluntary contributions, not through UN assessed contributions. This effectively tied the President's hands at Halifax, and he was only able to promise the Prime Minister that he would do what he could to convince Congress that the US should pay their share.

Next Steps

We and the French are continuing to take the line in New York that the reinforcements should be funded through assessed contributions in the usual way. Helpfully, the UN Secretariat is understood to be preparing a budget for presentation to the General Assembly later this week which assumes UN funding for all 12,500 extra troops.

We must however work on the assumption that the Americans will be able to block UN funding. We shall need to take swift action to protect the UK financial position. The main elements of our strategy are:

- To work closely with the French, whose interests coincide with ours.

RESTRICTED